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[I]t is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to 
control and regulate the government. The passions 
[of the public] ought to be controlled and regulated 
by the government.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 At least two bodies of legal scholarship have recently challenged 
the primacy of the traditional rational-actor, law and economics ap-
proach to law and policy.2 The first, taking a cognitive-psychological 
or behavioral economics approach, focuses on mental heuristics and 
biases that lead to departures from optimal or rational decisionmak-
ing. This literature is voluminous and increasing.3 A second line of 
legal scholarship focuses on the role of emotion in legal judgment and 
decisionmaking, whether by judges, juries, bureaucrats, legislators, 
or citizens. Although somewhat less developed than the first,4 this 
                                                                                                                    
 1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
 2. I use the term “recently” advisedly. Certainly, as discussed below, the second line 
of research—incorporating empirical research on the emotions—has only begun to be fully 
recognized. See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerg-
ing Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006). But scholars have noted the flawed axioms of 
law and economics and pure rational choice models, albeit sporadically, over at least the 
last five decades. See, e.g., JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND 
RATIONAL (1957); Ward Edwards, Behavioral Decision Theory, 12 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 473 
(1961); Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and their Implications 
for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986). More generally, psychologists and other social 
scientists have suggested that their research has useful application to the law since at 
least the early 20th century. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the 
Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 7-13 (2002) (reviewing the early con-
versation between the disciplines of psychology and law). And perhaps “challenged” is too 
weak a word. Both theoretical and empirical research in psychology and economics have 
demonstrated the unrealistic premises of the traditional law and economics approach, 
which assumes essentially rational, ideally unemotional actors who seek to maximize util-
ity and welfare. Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral 
Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1774 (2003) (“[T]he debate over whether the 
economists’ Chicago Man or the psychologists’ K-T Man better describes reality is over; the 
psychologists won.”). 
 3. For general overviews documenting the departures, see JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 2; HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL 
ECONOMICS (1991). For general discussions of the application of this literature to the law 
see, for example, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Ra-
tionality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: 
A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law 
and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 
739 (2000); Symposium, Empirical Legal Realism: A New Social Scientific Assessment of 
Law and Human Behavior, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1075 (2003).  
 4. This is so for a number of reasons. First, as a general matter, emotions have long 
been neglected in legal and economic discussions. Yuval Rottenstreich & Suzanne Shu, The 
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line of writing, and the empirical social science research it often 
seeks to incorporate, has likewise demonstrated departures from the 
traditional conception of a rational decisionmaker. Substantial em-
pirical evidence shows, for instance, that people make different 
judgments and choices when in a good mood than when in a bad 
mood.5 Emotion biases an individual’s perceptions of probability and 
                                                                                                                    
Connections Between Affect and Decision Making: Nine Resulting Phenomena, in 
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 444, 459 (Derek J. Koehler & 
Nigel Harvey eds. 2004) (“One unfortunate consequence of the historical conservative bias 
in decision-making research was neglect of affective phenomena.”); Jon Elster, Rationality 
and the Emotions, 106 ECON. J. 1386, 1386 (1996) (“Emotions are a neglected topic, and 
the neglect of economists is second to none.”). Recently, this “neglect” has been changing, 
with increasing discussion in the legal literature of issues relating to emotion. See, e.g., 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999); Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, 
and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 366-82 (1996); Jeremy A. Blumen-
thal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005) 
[hereinafter Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting]; Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance 
Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 
(1999); Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 
TENN. L. REV. 1 (1997); Peter H. Huang, Reasons Within Passions: Emotions and Inten-
tions in Property Rights Bargaining, 79 OR. L. REV. 435 (2000); Eric A. Posner, Law and 
the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001); Emotion in Legal Judgment and Decision Making, 
30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 115-248 (2006). See generally Blumenthal, supra 
note 2, at 24-25 (noting the recent increase in legal attention to the emotions); Laura E. 
Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 974 (2001) (dis-
cussing the same); Maroney, supra note 2 (reviewing the increase in scholarship). Second, 
there has been a tendency for legal discussion of emotions to focus on philosophical ap-
proaches; indeed, the best-known works on emotion in the law are those of philosophers. 
See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ALCHEMIES OF THE MIND: RATIONALITY AND THE EMOTIONS (1999); 
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001) 
[hereinafter NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT]; Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nuss-
baum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); Mar-
tha C. Nussbaum, “Secret Sewers of Vice”: Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in THE PASSIONS 
OF LAW, supra, at 19. To an extent, this has led to fewer efforts to incorporate empirical 
work into legal discussions than might be expected. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Does Mood In-
fluence Moral Judgment? An Empirical Test with Legal and Policy Implications, 29 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (2005) [hereinafter Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment] (noting 
that despite “interest in the potential for affect to influence ‘rational’ reasoning, legal 
scholars and social scientists have conducted far less empirical research directly testing 
such questions than might be expected”). Third, there is debate even among empirical so-
cial scientists about the nature and phenomenology of emotions, as well as about the proc-
esses by which emotion affects, influences, interacts with, controls, or is subject to, more 
“rational” cognitive processes. See generally HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES (Richard 
J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003); THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS (Paul 
Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994). Although the disagreement this debate has led 
to can be overstated, it can nevertheless yield a misleading picture of the field as some-
what incoherent. 
 5. For reviews of the extensive empirical data on the influence of mood on social and 
interpersonal judgments, see Gordon H. Bower, Mood Congruity of Social Judgments, in 
EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 31 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 1991); Joseph P. Forgas, Mood 
and Judgment: The Affect Infusion Model (AIM), 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 39 (1995); Norbert 
Schwarz, Feelings as Information: Informational and Motivational Functions of Affective 
States, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL 
BEHAVIOR 527 (E. Tory Higgins & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1990); and see generally 
FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 
2000). 
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risk.6 Similarly, contrary to the predictions of rational decisionmak-
ing, when a judgment about the outcome of a particular action is ac-
companied by strong emotion, people’s decisions about those out-
comes are relatively impervious to changes in their probability.7 And 
people tend to inaccurately predict their own future emotional 
states—as well as those of others—even when the predictions con-
cern important self-relevant events or, in some cases, are even min-
utes in the future.8  
 Commentators reviewing the burgeoning literature in these two 
lines of scholarship have begun to discuss its practical implications 
for the law. Most recently, they have focused on what the research 
might suggest for an increased third-party role to help protect indi-
viduals from their own biases.9 That is, the most recent discussion 
has focused on the findings’ implications for the appropriateness and 
scope of paternalistic policies.10 
 This paternalism discussion, however, has been incomplete in a 
number of contexts. First, despite a substantial focus on the implica-
tions of the first line of scholarship (documenting cognitive biases), 
commentators have addressed the implications of emotional biases 
far less.11 Second, much (but by no means all) of the most recent dis-
cussion has been in the context of intervention by private parties, 
                                                                                                                    
 6. See infra Part III.C.2.b.ii. 
 7. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 
112 YALE L.J. 61 (2002). 
 8. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166-73. 
 9. See, e.g., id. at 234-37; Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behav-
ioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 
(2003); Jolls et al., supra note 3; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2003); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, Individual Differences, and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
207 (2006) [hereinafter Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain 
Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003) [hereinafter Rachlinski, 
Uncertain Psychological Case]; Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Pater-
nalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). Responses to these proposals 
are percolating. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 133 (2006) (responding in part to Sunstein and Thaler’s proposals); Jonathan Klick & 
Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and Cognitive Hazards, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1620 (2006) (criticizing Sunstein and Thaler’s proposals); Gregory 
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005) (criticiz-
ing Sunstein and Thaler’s proposals); Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo, Paternalist 
Slopes, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 411 (2007). 
 10. J.D. Trout, Paternalism and Cognitive Bias, 24 LAW & PHIL. 393, 416 (2005) (“If 
individuals routinely make crucial and predictable errors in judgments about their own 
welfare, and are unable to control doing so without turning life into an existence of con-
templative paralysis or one of distorted value otherwise disavowed, then we should ask for 
an argument against introducing institutional prosthetics.”). 
 11. At times this is an explicit choice. E.g., Glaeser, supra note 9, at 136 (choosing to 
discuss paternalism in the context of bounded rationality rather than potentially emotional 
“self-control problems”). But see Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 234-37; 
Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1238-47; Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 1119 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000)). 
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rather than addressing potential governmental steps—legislative or 
judicial—to protect individuals from their errors. Third, although 
commentators have recently noted the importance of comparing the 
costs and benefits of paternalistic interventions, there has been little 
specification of those costs and benefits. In particular, commentators 
in this area have largely avoided the question of how difficult it 
might be to correct such biases, and thus how effective any such in-
terventions might in fact be. 
 In this Article, I evaluate and extend this developing discussion of 
using social science data to justify paternalism and address these 
three gaps in the literature. After Part II’s critical review of the ex-
isting literature, including discussion of whether paternalistic inter-
vention is justified in the first place,12 I move in Part III to remedy 
some of these gaps. I document not only cognitive but emotional bi-
ases that people are subject to, including a number that have been 
little discussed in legal academia. I note the importance of such emo-
tional biases to legal decisionmaking and illustrate potential legal 
errors to which they may lead.13 I also mention implications of such 
errors for paternalistic intervention by government, both by legisla-
tures and by courts. In the distinct contexts of cognitive and emo-
tional biases, one sort of government intervention may be appropri-
ate where another is not. Finally, in Part IV, I take steps toward 
evaluating the effectiveness of measures to correct cognitive and 
emotional biases, a step mentioned but not pursued in discussions of 
social science and paternalism.14 Specifically, I draw on empirical so-
cial science literature to examine whether effective mechanisms exist 
to correct various cognitive and emotional biases at the individual 
level, with implications for policy at the larger interpersonal and so-
cietal level.15 Throughout, I identify potential objections to some of 
the points I raise, summarizing and concluding with further specula-
tion about the appropriateness of paternalistic intervention by the 
State. 
 To preview, my points might be made as follows: as scholars are 
currently suggesting, based on people’s susceptibility to biased deci-
sionmaking, third-party intervention may at times be warranted. 
Most academic discussion of this point has focused on cognitive bi-
ases, but people are also—perhaps even more—susceptible to emo-
tional biases, many of which I review, along with the potential inter-
ventions they imply. As difficult as cognitive biases are to correct, 
                                                                                                                    
 12. See infra Part II.  
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1214-18; Mitchell, supra note 9; Rachlinski, Un-
certain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1219; See Trout, supra note 10, at 417 (“[T]here 
has been far less research on correcting biases than [on] establishing their existence.”). 
 15. See infra Part IV. 
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however, emotional biases may be even more difficult. That distinc-
tion has important consequences for the cost-benefit analysis that 
should evaluate the propriety of a paternalistic intervention, and I 
close the Article with a discussion of weighing such costs and bene-
fits. 
II.   WHY PATERNALISM? 
A.   Defining Paternalism 
 As an initial matter, of course, what do we mean by “paternal-
ism”? More broadly, why should any sort of intervention into an indi-
vidual’s behavior, preferences, attitudes, or autonomy be warranted? 
 Unsurprisingly, there is no unequivocal definition of “paternal-
ism” or of what constitutes a “paternalistic act.” Some definitions 
suggest simply that it is an action taken in order to benefit the ac-
tion’s target.16 Some focus as well on the degree of consent expressed 
by the target, emphasizing that a paternalistic act toward B is one 
that would be pursued by A if A acted for B’s benefit and would do so 
even knowing that B did not consent.17 Most commonly, a paternalis-
tic act is seen as some action by one party that interferes with an-
other person’s freedom, with the goal of furthering the latter’s own 
good.18 
 This conventional definition may be incomplete, however. Donald 
VanDeVeer has pointed out an additional factor that will become 
relevant in the present discussion, and that ties in to Shapiro and 
                                                                                                                    
 16. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 
522 (1988) (“At the core of every definition . . . is the notion that [a paternalistic action] 
must be taken in order to benefit [the target].”). As Professor Shapiro and others recognize, 
this is almost certainly too broad a definition. Id. at 523; see also DONALD VANDEVEER, 
PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS ON BENEVOLENCE 17-18 (1986) (sug-
gesting that simply benevolent or altruistic actions need not be considered “paternalistic”). 
 17. See Shapiro, supra note 16, at 523; cf. Paul Burrows, Analyzing Legal Paternal-
ism, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 489, 495 (1995) (arguing that an action is paternalistic “if its 
intention . . . is to persuade, induce, or compel any individual to do something that he 
would not otherwise have chosen to do, in order to bring benefits to that individual”). 
 18. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE 
L.J. 763, 763 (1983) (“[A]ny legal rule that prohibits an action on the ground that it would 
be contrary to the actor’s own welfare is paternalistic.”); Trout, supra note 10, at 408 (de-
fining paternalism as “the interference with a person’s actions or knowledge, against that 
person’s will, for the purpose of promoting that person’s good”); VANDEVEER, supra note 
16, at 18 (arguing that a paternalistic act is one that “interferes with another with the aim 
of promoting his/her own good (or preventing harm from accruing to that other)”); Eyal 
Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 236 (1998) (“Paternalism is in-
tervention in a person’s freedom aimed at furthering her own good.”); cf. Andrew Caplin, 
Fear as a Policy Instrument, in TIME AND DECISION: ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERTEMPORAL CHOICE 441, 454 (George Loewenstein et al. eds., 2003) 
(“Even if head-in-the-sand behavior is currently attractive, the social planner may have 
reason to intervene if he or she believes that the subject will later be grateful for interven-
tion.”). 
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others’ connection of paternalism with consent. That is, conduct may 
in fact be paternalistic even when it apparently is done with the tar-
get’s consent. In VanDeVeer’s example, an individual who believes he 
will drink too much at a party gives his car keys to a friend, asking 
the friend to hide the keys or in some other way prevent him from 
driving home.19 When the friend does in fact refuse to return the keys 
upon the drinker’s post-debauch request, he may be seen to be acting 
paternalistically—acting against the drinker’s wishes for the 
drinker’s own good—despite the drinker’s (initial) consent. Thus, un-
der VanDeVeer’s approach, “an action is paternalist if it is at odds 
with the subject’s preferences at the time of the action; paternalist 
action may be justified, however, by prior consent.”20 
 Thus, paternalistic action need not only be action that violates a 
subject’s consent. More important, this example demonstrates the 
“multiple selves” problem: which preference should be privileged 
when someone expresses a preference at Time1 that changes at 
Time2?21 This tension arises in the opposite direction as well, when 
courts step in to protect an individual from his own previous deci-
sionmaking biases or errors. In these circumstances, an individual 
made a decision at Time1 that he realizes at Time2 does not reflect 
his true preferences (this reverses VanDeVeer’s example, where the 
Time1 choice reflects the individual’s true preferences, but the Time2 
choice—made when inebriated—does not). He therefore seeks judi-
cial intervention at Time2 to release him from the consequences of 
that decision.22 In both sets of circumstances, there is a tension be-
                                                                                                                    
 19. VANDEVEER, supra note 16, at 23-24. 
 20. Shapiro, supra note 16, at 524 n.17. 
 21. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 179 n.156 (noting multiple 
selves problem); Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An 
Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55, 92 (1999) 
(raising issue of “which phase of an individual’s evolving personality has priority when her 
wishes [at Time1] differ from those [at Time2]”); Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the 
Rationality Assumption, 3 LEGAL THEORY 105, 120 (1997) (noting the likely “incompatible” 
preferences of a person’s “separate selves” and asking which should be privileged). For em-
pirical evidence that this problem occurs, see Emily Pronin & Lee Ross, Temporal Differ-
ences in Trait Self-Ascription: When the Self is Seen as an Other, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. (2006) (demonstrating that individuals see their past and future selves as a dif-
ferent person from their present self). 
 22. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social 
Science Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) 
[hereinafter Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion]; see also Blumenthal, Affec-
tive Forecasting, supra note 4, at 235-37;  infra Part III.C.2.c.i (discussing, in the context of 
paternalism, one commentator’s suggestion that courts broaden securities law doctrine to 
include consideration of potential emotional biases in order to protect investors against 
emotional, as well as cognitive, errors). This is an example of what Klick and Mitchell refer 
to more broadly as “ex post paternalism.” Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1636. With 
Klick and Mitchell, then, I consider such judicial paternalism “simply shorthand for gov-
ernment assistance available to protect a party from an earlier, supposedly irrational act.” 
Id. at 1636 n.48. 
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tween an expressed preference at one time that (a) is different from 
that expressed at another time and, more important, (b) does not re-
flect what the decisionmaker’s true preferences would be at the time 
of the expressed preference. Either example, therefore, may warrant 
intervention to privilege the true preference, whether expressed at 
Time1 or Time2.23 The question thus becomes, what sort of interven-
tion might be allowed to privilege one preference set over a conflict-
ing set?24 
 Other definitions of paternalism seem overbroad. In a recent arti-
cle on paternalism, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler allude to gov-
ernment rules about who should bear the loss in an accident as an 
example of “[d]efault rules” that “much of the time” influence prefer-
ences and choices, and that thus constitute paternalism.25 They also 
suggest that paternalistic intervention may be “inevitable,” in the 
sense that default rules always have some effect on decisionmaking.26 
Thus, any time a central planner establishes some such rule, that 
planner has acted paternalistically to an extent, influencing the indi-
vidual’s choice.27 Implicit in their discussion of default rules is that 
any government action—even a “minimum of state intervention”28—
can qualify as paternalistic.  
 But all state action, even that which “affect[s] preferences and 
choices,” need not be considered paternalistic in the conventional 
sense.29 Their example—deciding which party should bear a loss—
                                                                                                                    
 23. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 216 n.400 and following 
text (suggesting some circumstances in which such intervention can be appropriate). This 
approach, of course, is not just a means for an individual to simply change his mind from 
Time1 to Time2—an “escape hatch”—and thereby obtain judicial intervention. See id. at 
213 nn.386-87 and accompanying text; Coleman, supra note 21, at 98-99 n.209. The dis-
tinction is related to Professor Shapiro’s framing of “ ‘regret theory’ [which] distinguish[es] 
between disappointment, which we need not worry about . . . and regret, which is cause for 
concern. . . . A person suffers regret if he commits himself to a course of action that he later 
wishes to abandon because of a change of goals.” Shapiro, supra note 16, at 549. 
 24. See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 3, at 1124 (“The proper answer to [such] ques-
tions might rest, at least in part, on whether we believe that the present self or the future 
self best represents the preferences of the single individual. In all likelihood, this will have 
to be a situation-specific judgment.”). 
 25. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1174-75 (“[A] minimum of state intervention 
is always necessary. . . . When a loss is left where it falls in an auto accident, it is not be-
cause G[-]d so ordained it. Rather it is because the state has granted the injurer an enti-
tlement to be free of liability and will intervene to prevent the victim’s friends, if they are 
stronger, from taking compensation from the injurer.” (quoting Guido Calabresi & A. Doug-
las Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1972))). 
 26. Id. at 1174. 
 27. Specifically, Sunstein and Thaler argue that often, “some organization or agent 
must make a choice that will affect the behavior of some other people. There is, in those 
situations, no alternative to a kind of paternalism—at least in the form of an intervention 
that affects what people choose.” Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164.  
 28. Id. at 1174. 
 29. Id. 
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may affect behavior, but is not designed to protect a decisionmaker 
from her own expressed (and perhaps biased) preferences; indeed, in 
their own terms, the rule protects the injurer from the behavior of 
others and, perhaps, protects society against individual inefficiencies 
and biases. 
 To the extent that this argument is not tautological, then it is 
somewhat overbroad. Certainly, not every choice or rule by an agent 
that simply affects the decisions or behavior of a target need be con-
sidered paternalistic. Affecting someone’s behavior or choices is al-
most certainly a necessary condition for conduct to be paternalistic, 
but for it to be a sufficient condition suggests that any governmental 
action should be so considered, which is too broad a claim.30 That 
said, default rules are especially influential given individuals’ prefer-
ence for the status quo. These authors’ emphasis on both the power 
of default rules to affect behavior and the frequency with which such 
rules must be chosen is important and describes one of the more ef-
fective potential mechanisms for intervention.31 
 Thus, despite recognizing the looseness in the term, I use “pater-
nalism” in a conventional sense, to suggest some sort of third-party 
intervention into behavior or—in the present context—into individu-
als’ decisionmaking processes, with the goal of protecting individuals 
against the consequences of actual or potential biases in that proc-
ess.32 Given the present discussion, I incorporate VanDeVeer’s notion 
                                                                                                                    
 30. See supra note 25 and following text; cf. supra note 16 and accompanying text. In-
deed, elsewhere in their article, Sunstein and Thaler use a different definition of paternal-
ism, closer to the one sketched above. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1162 (“[A] policy 
therefore counts as ‘paternalistic’ if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties 
in a way that will make choosers better off.”). 
 31. Professor Mitchell objects to this inevitability argument on empirical grounds as 
well, suggesting that the possibility of correcting (or “debiasing”) such individuals’ biased 
decisionmaking undercuts Sunstein and Thaler’s claim. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 
1248-60. Despite my objection to Sunstein and Thaler’s suggestion, I am not sure Mitchell’s 
point is wholly persuasive either. As discussed further below, and as Mitchell recognizes, 
debiasing is in fact just one (albeit weaker) mode of paternalistic intervention. Cf. Jolls et 
al., supra note 3, at 1544 (“[G]overnment intervention need not come in highly coercive 
forms . . . . For instance, in the contexts of risks such as smoking, might debiasing tech-
niques work to link the statistical evidence with the personal reality?”). Consequently, if a 
goal of intervention is to improve decisionmaking (a goal Mitchell challenges, see Mitchell, 
supra note 9, at 1260-69; but see Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9), then biased decisionmak-
ing does plausibly warrant intervention. Moreover, as discussed further in Part IV, debias-
ing is often unsuccessful and, at times, counterproductive. In any event, Mitchell’s chal-
lenge to Sunstein and Thaler focuses more on the libertarian part of their approach, not 
the paternalism part—that is, on their assertion that a committed libertarian would find 
their model of paternalism appealing. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1247-48 (suggesting 
that the focus of his criticisms is the libertarian aspect of Sunstein and Thaler’s claims); 
see also Glaeser, supra note 9, at 135 (disagreeing with Sunstein and Thaler’s assertion). 
 32. Elsewhere I note the issue of what role intervention might play, not in the context 
of avoiding disutility, but of enhancing individuals’ welfare from baseline. See generally Pe-
ter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Law and Policy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (Shane J. Lopez ed., forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Huang & Blu-
10  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
that such intervention (“interference”) will often at least appear to be 
against the target’s preferences or expressed interests, whether ar-
ticulated at Time1 or Time2. Specifically, what I will call emotional 
paternalism is conduct, typically governmental, that intervenes in an 
actor’s decision or decisionmaking, at Time1 or Time2, either when 
that decisionmaking involves judgments about emotions or emotion-
ally-laden topics, or when it was or has the potential to be biased by 
affective factors (that is, emotions evoked by the target of a judgment 
or incidental, transient moods). 
B.   Justifying Paternalism 
 Of more concern, perhaps, given the pejorative connotation tradi-
tionally attached to the term,33 is why commentators are increasingly 
willing to discuss some sort of paternalism. One answer, useful as a 
first step—but, I suggest, ultimately unsatisfactory—is Sunstein and 
Thaler’s argument that even if paternalism per se is a so-called 
“evil,” it may be a lesser one, one that is necessary, or at least inevi-
table.34 A stronger answer, to which they also point, is grounded in 
empirical evidence suggesting that the usual objections to paternal-
ism are weaker than is traditionally assumed. 
 The first such objection is typically that people know their own 
preferences and are best at choosing them. Libertarian philosophy,35 
welfare economics, and numerous legal doctrines36 rely on this as-
sumption. But substantial empirical evidence shows this is not al-
ways the case. At a broad level, it is increasingly apparent that peo-
ple are unable to accurately predict their emotional reactions to fu-
ture events and, thus, are unable to accurately predict how happy or 
unhappy an event—such as the satisfaction of a particular prefer-
ence—might make them.37 I have suggested elsewhere that “if we do 
                                                                                                                    
menthal, Positive Law and Policy]; Peter H. Huang & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Positive Pol-
icy/Positive Institutions, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY (C.R. Snyder & Shane J. 
Lopez eds., forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Huang & Blumenthal, Positive Policy/Positive 
Institutions]. 
 33. See, e.g., Paul Burrows, Patronising Paternalism, 45 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 542, 
542 (1993) (“ ‘[P]aternalism’ is a term of abuse. Paternalism is seen as illiberal, coercive, 
arrogant and patronizing . . . .”); Glaeser, supra note 9, at 133 (noting “economics’ tradi-
tional hostility towards paternalism”); Shapiro, supra note 16, at 519 (“[P]aternalism has 
not been held in high regard by democratic theorists and practitioners.”). 
 34. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164.  
 35. See, e.g., James W. Child, Can Libertarianism Sustain a Fraud Standard?, 104 
ETHICS 722, 729-30 (1994) (describing assumption of libertarianism that people have a 
“stable set of preferences”); Mitchell, supra note 9. 
 36. See Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1178 (“The ability 
of individuals to make good choices for themselves lies at the heart of an enormous collec-
tion of legal rules.”). 
 37. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166-72; Daniel Kahneman et 
al., Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. ECON. 375 (1997); 
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not know what will make us happy or unhappy—or, more precisely, 
how much something will make us happy or unhappy and how long it 
will do so—then we can never be sure how to maximize happiness or 
minimize unhappiness.”38 
 More narrowly, people often make a variety of poor decisions; fi-
nancial ones, for instance, especially prospective decisions such as 
concerning savings and retirement options.39 Sometimes this is due 
to active choices that turn out to be nonoptimal; other times it is due 
to inertia or a disinclination to make decisions (for example, choices 
that are influenced by the “default rules” Sunstein and Thaler dis-
cuss).40 Such self-injurious choices occur in health and safety contexts 
as well:41 overoptimism and other self-serving cognitive biases can 
lead to misperceptions of risks to the self—such as a smoker’s under-
estimate of his risk of dying from lung cancer, despite an overesti-
mate of the link between smoking and cancer—that lead to nonopti-
mal, unhealthy behavior.42 Similarly, consumers might be willing, 
because of overoptimism, to waive a right to recover for various sorts 
of injury.43 And such behavior occurs in that ostensibly most rational 
of arenas—the marketplace. For instance, as discussed below, Rus-
sell Korobkin has argued for an expanded reading of unconscionabil-
ity doctrine based on the likelihood that cognitive biases will allow 
sellers to manipulate buyers.44 And erroneous estimates of the likeli-
hood of one’s own breach, or that of the other contracting party, can 
lead parties to bear risks that they did not fully consider, or to fail to 
consider appropriate remedies for breach.45 Of course, such evidence 
of bounded self-knowledge46 need not be read as mandating paternal-
istic intervention, but simply as weakening the traditional conse-
quentialist objection to paternalistic policies.47 
                                                                                                                    
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of Property 
Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1678-79, 1682 n.58 (2003). 
 38. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 231. 
 39. E.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and 
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991). 
 40. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1181. 
 41. See generally Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1180-81 
(giving examples). 
 42. Id. at 1180 (citing Paul Slovic, Do Adolescent Smokers Know the Risks?, 47 DUKE 
L.J. 1133, 1137 (1998)). 
 43. E.g., Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural 
Unconscionability, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 26-34 (2003); Edward L. Rubin, Types of Con-
tracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903, 1910-11 (2000).  
 44. Korobkin, supra note 9, at 1206. 
 45. See Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1178-79 (giving ex-
amples). 
 46. Chris Guthrie suggested this term to me.   
 47. Cf. infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. 
12  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
 Second, there is the usual argument from autonomy, traditionally 
relied on by legal theorists48 and, more recently, by those empirical 
researchers apparently uncomfortable with the direction in which 
their data point:49 people’s freedom to make choices, even nonoptimal 
ones, should be valued per se.50 Alternatively, as a sort of mixed util-
ity and autonomy argument, we should value people’s preferences for 
the freedom to make choices. That is, the freedom to choose should 
also be protected because people value that freedom itself.51 
 In his assessments of paternalism, Paul Burrows has identified 
two general justifications for the presumption that the freedom to 
choose is valuable per se and warrants protection against interfer-
ence.52 First, choosing is a skill that improves with experience;53 
moreover, choosing and accepting responsibility for one’s choices 
builds character.54 Second, reflecting in part the mixed justification 
noted above, “choosing is an act which yields utility independently of 
the nature of the outcome of the choice.”55 Professor Burrows criti-
cized these claims, pointing out, for instance, that choice between 
                                                                                                                    
 48. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 16, at 538 (suggesting that numerous courts’ will-
ingness to sustain challenges to various sorts of legislation in fact stems from this anti-
paternalist perspective, that is, the importance placed on the right to be “let alone” in mak-
ing choices for oneself). 
 49. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 236 (noting this hesitancy 
in researchers discussing such findings); cf. Colin F. Camerer, Wanting, Liking, and Learn-
ing: Neuroscience and Paternalism, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 93 (2006) (“By the way, note that 
I am truly not an eager paternalist.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private 
Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1171 (1986) (distinguishing between governmental 
“interference” and “troublesome” paternalism.) 
 50. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1167 n.22 (“Some of the standard argu-
ments against paternalism rest not on consequences but on autonomy—on a belief that 
people are entitled to make their own choices even if they err.”). But see, e.g., John A. 
Robertson, Precommitment Strategies for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 
989, 1024 (2001) (suggesting that the potential gains from precommitment strategies he 
argues for “should not be shunted aside with an ipse dixit about personal liberty”). 
 51. See Zamir, supra note 18, at 240 (suggesting that “[h]aving relatively broad free-
dom to make one’s own decisions, including wrong ones, is probably quite high on most 
people’s list of ideal preferences”). 
 52. Burrows, supra note 33, at 556. 
 53. Id. Klick and Mitchell also seem to advance this approach, relying on psychologi-
cal theory suggesting that the decisionmaking process tends toward a learning process, 
and thus, people should be allowed to make mistakes and learn from them. See Klick & 
Mitchell, supra note 9; see also Shapiro, supra note 16, at 546 (“[T]he very ability to 
choose—which necessarily implies the ability to make poor choices by some objective stan-
dard—is critical to the growth of our diverse intellectual, emotional, and volitional capaci-
ties.”). That theory, and the findings upon which Klick and Mitchell rely, however, may not 
be as clear-cut as they suggest. See James P. Byrnes, The Development of Decision-making, 
31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 208, 214 (2002) (the psychologist on whose work they rely most 
heavily notes that despite his model and findings, “learning is by no means automatic 
when people are shown the errors of their ways,” outlining circumstances in which such 
learning may not occur). 
 54. Burrows, supra note 33, at 556. 
 55. Id. 
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unpleasant options is likely painful and may not build character.56 
Moreover, he suggested that there is no presumptive reason to as-
sume that skill in making decisions in one context should translate 
to other contexts.57 
 Over and above these conceptual qualifications, empirical re-
search undercuts the second general justification in at least two 
ways.58 First, it seems that people often prefer not to have to make 
decisions.59 During the decisionmaking process, individuals tend to 
prefer to “keep[ ] doors open”; that is, to retain the option of changing 
their minds, even at the expense of decision quality.60 Second, when 
they do make decisions, both the preference for choice61 and having 
more options from which to choose can lead to less utility and worse 
decisions.62 Empirical research shows that although people often 
want a decision to be reversible—that is, they prefer the possibility of 
changing their mind—they are often less satisfied with their choice 
when it is reversible relative to when they make a decision and are 
                                                                                                                    
 56. Id. at 556-57. 
 57. Id. at 557. But see Klick & Mitchell, supra note 9. 
 58. The research findings thus do address the autonomy rationale “head-on.” Shapiro, 
supra note 16, at 547 (“Some defenses of limited paternalist intervention do not attempt to 
meet these [autonomy] arguments head-on.”). 
 59. See Jane Beattie et al., Psychological Determinants of Decision Attitude, 7 J. 
BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 129 (1994) (noting situations leading to hesitancy to make decisions); 
Barry Schwartz et al., Maximizing Versus Satisficing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice, 83 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1178 (2002) (reporting that increased options often make 
decisionmakers less happy with outcomes); Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, 
Second-Order Decisions, 110 ETHICS 5 (1999) (discussing contexts in which people prefer to 
have others make their decisions); Philip E. Tetlock et al., The Psychology of the Unthink-
able: Taboo Trade-Offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 853 (2000) (noting tendencies to reject or avoid making de-
cisions involving highly morally-charged issues); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory 
of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980); see also Korobkin, supra note 9, 
at 1223 (noting consumers’ preference for minimizing the effort of a decision); Amy B. 
Monahan, Addressing the Problem of Impatients, Impulsives, and Other Imperfect Actors in 
401(k) Plans, 23 VA. TAX. REV. 471, 509-10 & n.157 (2004) (discussing pension plan par-
ticipants’ tendency to procrastinate in deciding to enroll; noting success of automatic en-
rollment procedures in avoiding procrastination due to “low transaction costs”). 
 60. Jiwoong Shin & Dan Ariely, Keeping Doors Open: The Effect of Unavailability on 
Incentives to Keep Options Viable, 50 MGMT. SCI. 575, 575 (2004). 
 61. See Daniel T. Gilbert & Jane E.J. Ebert, Decisions and Revisions: The Affective 
Forecasting of Changeable Outcomes, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 503 (2002). 
 62. Schwartz et al., supra note 59, at 1178-79; cf. Ellen Berscheid & Bruce Campbell, 
The Changing Longevity of Heterosexual Close Relationships: A Commentary and Forecast, 
in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND 
CHANGE 209, 223 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981) (noting, in quite a differ-
ent context, that “[t]o have a perpetual choice means that one must choose not once, but 
over and over again. And to do so, one must continually expend time and energy in evalu-
ating and reevaluating the wisdom of the choice.”). In fact, the simple act of considering al-
ternatives and choosing between options can increase the appeal of the foregone option. Ziv 
Carmon et al., Option Attachment: When Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing, 30 
J. CONSUMER RES. 15 (2003).  
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committed to it.63 More broadly, recent empirical work calls into 
question the traditional assumptions that choice—and the perception 
of control over that choice—generates utility and psychological well-
being.64 In fact, too much choice can be conflicting, difficult, and may 
even lead to decreased experienced utility.65 Thus, the assumption 
that people value making decisions is often wrong. Moreover, even 
when it is correct, the ability to choose can lead to decreased, not in-
creased, utility.66 Another aspect of the autonomy argument is thus 
weakened. Again, this weakening does not mean the argument is in-
valid or that paternalistic policies necessarily trump any claim to in-
dividual autonomy. The data simply suggest that the standard objec-
tions must meet higher hurdles than have heretofore been set in or-
der to be fully persuasive.67 
C.   Literature on Social Science and Paternalism 
 Building on these and other data, legal commentators have thus 
lately moved the long-standing debate over the propriety of paternal-
istic intervention into the empirical realm. Such analysis proffers so-
cial science findings as one response to traditional objections to pa-
ternalism. For instance, in a provocative article presenting much of 
the cognitive heuristics and biases literature in a systematic way,68 
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler identified an 
“anti-antipaternalism” argument reflecting the discussion above.69 In 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Gilbert & Ebert, supra note 61. 
 64. See, e.g., Ap Dijksterhuis, Think Different: The Merits of Unconscious Thought in 
Preference Development and Decision Making, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 586 
(2004) (reporting experiments showing that unconscious decisions can be better than more 
fully considered decisions). 
 65. Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One De-
sire Too Much of a Good Thing?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 1003-04 (2000) 
[hereinafter Iyengar & Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating] (reporting that people are 
more satisfied when choices are limited); Schwartz et al., supra note 59, at 1179 (suggest-
ing that for some people, too much choice can lead to negative psychological well-being); see 
also Sheena S. Iyengar & Mark R. Lepper, Choice and Its Consequences: On the Costs and 
Benefits of Self-Determination, in SELF AND MOTIVATION: EMERGING PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 71, 76-83 (Abraham Tesser et al. eds., 2002) (noting cultural influences on 
the benefits of choice). 
 66. See Iyengar & Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating, supra note 65, at 1004 
(showing that manufacturers and marketers have identified the problem of “too much 
choice” and that one company found that reducing the number of products in a product line 
led to increased sales). One reason the Iyengar and Lepper findings are surprising is an es-
tablished line of psychological scholarship supporting the intuitive link between choice and 
utility. See id. at 995-96 (describing studies). Taking all these findings together might sug-
gest that for various choices and for some people there may be some optimal number of 
choices.  If so, one question in the paternalism context is whether government can and 
should intervene to identify and administer that optimal number.  
 67. Of course, the imposition on autonomy could simply be seen as another cost to be 
considered in the cost-benefit analysis. See infra Part V. 
 68. Jolls et al., supra note 3. 
 69. Id. at 1541-45. 
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particular, they addressed the standard consequentialist objection to 
paternalism that people generally know what is good for them. They 
characterized this objection, reflected in the traditional law and eco-
nomics approach, as presuming that “citizens, assuming they have 
reasonable access to relevant information, are . . . the best judges of 
what will promote their own welfare.”70 Jolls and colleagues re-
sponded, however, that the behavioral law and economics literature 
demonstrates that people are likely worse at judging what will pro-
mote their own welfare than we have traditionally assumed. To the 
extent this is so, the objection to paternalistic policies is correspond-
ingly weakened—“anti-antipaternalism.”71 
 Jolls and colleagues thus set out “a skepticism about antipaternal-
ism but not an affirmative defense of paternalism.”72 In other arti-
cles, however, Sunstein and Thaler have extended this approach, 
suggesting that some sort of paternalistic intervention is in fact in-
evitable.73 Again, they argued that often an organization or agent 
must make some choice that will affect the behavior and decision-
making of others; therefore, to that extent, any such choice can be 
seen as paternalistic.74 In a useful approach, Sunstein and Thaler 
documented various grades of paternalistic interventions—“minimal 
paternalism, required active choices, procedural constraints, and 
substantive constraints”75—and set out broad suggestions for how to 
evaluate the propriety of any such policy using cost-benefit analy-
sis.76 
 In an article published about the same time as Sunstein and 
Thaler’s, Jeff Rachlinski also detailed a number of (primarily cogni-
tive) errors, noting the potential paternalistic policies those errors 
seem to warrant.77 Rachlinski suggested that policy makers cannot 
rely on “merely identifying . . . a cognitive [or emotional] error” to 
justify paternalistic intervention.78 Rather, he too advocated cost-
benefit analysis in evaluating such policies; specifically, “the costs of 
                                                                                                                    
 70. Id. at 1541. 
 71. Id. at 1541-45. 
 72. Id. at 1541. 
 73. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1171. 
 74. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164, 1174. But see supra notes 25-31 
and accompanying text. 
 75. Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1167, 1188. 
 76. Id. at 1190-95. 
 77. Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9. 
 78. Id. at 1225; see id. at 1168 (“Even heuristically driven individual choice can be 
trusted far more than legal scholars have realized, so long as individuals can learn better 
decisionmaking strategies or delegate their choices to those who have. Merely linking a 
cognitive bias in judgment to a decision that law could regulate should not support imple-
menting a constraint on individual choice.”); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1139 (“[T]he iden-
tification of defects in a system based on private preferences is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for a regulatory solution.”). 
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either learning to adopt a superior approach to a choice or relying on 
others to make a choice” must outweigh the cost of the policy.79 Thus, 
included in the assessment of the costs of a particular policy must be 
the difficulty involved in helping people learn to avoid or correct the 
bias at which that policy is aimed, and/or the costs of arranging for 
someone else to make the relevant decision.80 Neither Professor 
Rachlinski nor other scholars, however, examined such costs in much 
detail.81 
 These commentators have focused primarily on the first line of 
scholarship challenging the traditional rational decisionmaker 
model—that is, the “Kahneman-Tversky,” cognitive heuristics and 
biases line. But there are a number of important contexts in which 
information about emotional biases, and about decisionmaking “un-
der the influence” of emotion—all of which can lead to nonoptimal 
decisions—can have implications for third-party intervention into 
such decisions, or into the process of making them. 
 Little analysis of these topics exists, however, in the context of 
emotion. I recently made some speculative comments in a discussion 
of one particular emotional error involving affective forecasting (i.e., 
the prediction of future emotional states).82 Camerer and colleagues 
discuss various instances of “cooling-off periods,” in which policies 
are established that allow consumers to reconsider decisions made 
under the influence of emotional factors, presumably when they have 
returned to a cooler, more “rational” state83 (as I point out below, 
however, cooling-off periods may in fact not be as effective as has 
been assumed). Sunstein and Thaler mention cooling-off periods as 
well, though their brief discussion is somewhat ambiguous as to 
whether the goal of such policies is to correct cognitive or emotional 
susceptibilities; Rachlinski gives a similar impression.84 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                    
 79. Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1219. 
 80. Cf. Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 59 (discussing steps individuals 
might take to arrange for others to make relevant decisions). Colin Camerer and colleagues 
recently made a similar argument to Rachlinski’s in documenting a range of errors in deci-
sionmaking that might warrant paternalistic intervention, both in the private domain and 
by the state. Camerer et al., supra note 9. In recommending “asymmetric paternalism,” de-
fined as regulation that benefits those who are subject to decisionmaking errors but that 
imposes little cost on those who make fully rational decisions, they acknowledge the impor-
tance of considering the “implementation costs” of a particular regulation or policy. Id. at 
1212, 1219. 
 81. Id. at 1254 (calling for less debate over whether paternalism is justified and more 
empirical discussion of “whether the benefits of mistake prevention are larger than the 
harms imposed on rational people”); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1173 (“To be justified, the 
governmental solution must make the situation better rather than worse.”). 
 82. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at Part III.C. 
 83. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1238-47. 
 84. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1188-89 (discussing cooling-off periods). 
Sunstein and Thaler discuss cooling-off periods as protecting against decisions made in 
“the heat of the moment” or when “emotions are likely to be running high”; still, they sug-
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Sunstein’s discussion of implications of individuals’ inaccurate per-
ception of risk,85 in which he also draws inferences about interven-
tions, has been sharply criticized for seeming to frame “fear” as too 
cognitive or rationalistic—that is, for reducing the emotion of fear to, 
in essence, cognitive misperception of risk.86 
 Thus, what little work exists in this context has either been pre-
liminary,87 has focused primarily on cognitive biases, or has arguably 
conflated cognition and emotion.88 It often focuses on intervention by 
private parties, rather than addressing potential governmental steps 
(legislative or judicial) to protect individuals from their errors.89 Fi-
nally, much of this work has not considered in detail actual social 
science data about the emotions, about the biases or errors in deci-
sionmaking to which emotions can lead, or about the effectiveness 
with which any of these biases might be corrected.90 The remainder of 
this Article starts to remedy these gaps. I begin with a more detailed 
discussion of cognition and emotion in general, and of these cognitive 
and emotional biases in particular, including the implications those 
biases have for third-party, “protective” intervention. 
                                                                                                                    
gest that both “bounded rationality and bounded self-control” are the underlying concerns. 
Id. at 1189. The suggestion seems to have as much a cognitive focus as an emotional focus. 
Rachlinski raises cooling-off periods in the context of protecting against “cognitive strate-
gies sales people might use to induce consumers to enter into transactions.” Rachlinski, 
Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, at 1224 n.297.  
 85. Sunstein, supra note 11.  
 86. Rachel F. Moran, Fear Unbound: A Reply to Professor Sunstein, 42 WASHBURN 
L.J. 1 (2002). In a more recent book review, Sunstein does raise other effects of emotion on 
perceptions and decisionmaking. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 751 (2003) (reviewing HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGEMENT (Thomas Gilovoch et al. eds., 2002)). Two of his suggestions are relevant here. 
First, he points to the phenomenon of probability neglect, noting that when a judgment 
about the outcome of a particular action is accompanied by strong emotion, or is otherwise 
heavily affect-laden, people’s decisions about those outcomes are relatively impervious to 
changes in the probability of the outcome. Id. at 771; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 70-82. This 
phenomenon is discussed further below. Second, he suggests more broadly that emotions 
may act similarly to “low-level” or automatic cognitive judgments, “quick but error-prone,” 
that can be corrected upon more conscious reflection. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, su-
pra, at 768-70. He notes, however, that such correction may be difficult, depending on the 
emotion. Id. at 771 (“[W]hen people are anxious and fearful, they are less likely to engage 
in systematic processing, and [such correction] is especially unreliable.”). A more detailed 
discussion of such correction difficulties will figure prominently in Part IV, infra.  See also 
Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22 (discussing this statement 
by Sunstein). 
 87. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 234-37. 
 88. See Sunstein, supra note 11; Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1188-89. 
 89. E.g., Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1164-66 (discussing “paternalistic” steps 
by cafeteria supervisors at a business). But see id. at 1195-96 (describing Swiss interven-
tion to try to improve pension fund investment). 
 90. E.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1059, 1070-71 nn.38-40 and accompanying text (2000); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 1140 
nn.88-89 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 66 n.26; Cass R. Sunstein et 
al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1164 n.43 (2002). 
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III.   IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL BIASES FOR 
PATERNALISTIC INTERVENTION 
 The previous Part outlined some preliminary analysis applying 
social science research to justify the possibility of paternalistic poli-
cies (or at least responding to antipaternalistic objections to certain 
intervention). In this Part, I extend the discussion. First, I clarify my 
distinction between cognition and emotion in Part III.A. After sum-
marizing in Part III.B some of the cognitive biases that have been 
identified, I proceed in Part III.C to a discussion of emotional biases. 
There, I first identify three important theoretical distinctions to con-
sider. Using those distinctions as an underlying framework, I then 
discuss in more detail a number of emotional biases and their impli-
cations for paternalistic policies. 
A.   Emotion and Cognition 
 I particularly want to distinguish for present purposes—to the ex-
tent possible—between “cognition” or “cognitive processes,” and 
“emotion” or “emotional processes.” There are two primary justifica-
tions for doing so, especially in the context of examining paternalism. 
First, few previous treatments make the distinction. Second, and 
more important, doing so highlights differences between cognitive 
and emotional biases in terms of the ability to correct them. In turn, 
as I show in Part IV, differences in the correctability of emotional 
versus cognitive biases can have crucial implications for the likeli-
hood of any intervention succeeding, as well as for the level of inva-
siveness necessary for such an intervention to succeed. That is, to the 
extent one type of bias might be easier to correct, less “interference” 
with individual decisionmaking might be necessary and the interven-
tion will be more likely to succeed. Finally, the degree of interference 
and the potential for success both have important implications in 
turn for the tolerance with which a particular intervention is likely 
to be received by the target and by the public in general. These 
points are discussed in Parts IV and V. 
 To some extent, this distinction is artificial; emotional and cogni-
tive or rational processes are somewhat related. This is especially 
relevant because the philosophical work on emotions most cited in 
law operates from this approach, arguing that emotions are typically 
based on some sort of beliefs or judgments about the world.91 
 Jon Elster, for instance, argues on the one hand that emotions 
typically “have cognitive antecedents. . . . [They] are triggered by be-
                                                                                                                    
 91. E.g., ELSTER, supra note 4; NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 4. 
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liefs about events or states of the world.”92 On the other hand, Elster 
qualifies his view in a number of ways.93 The most important is his 
discussion of neurobiological evidence showing that perceptual cues 
that give rise to emotional reactions—such as fear—can actually by-
pass conscious awareness. Specifically, there are two neural path-
ways from sensory areas to the amygdala, where a fear response oc-
curs. One goes through the neocortex, where most conscious cogni-
tion occurs; but a second, “quick and dirty” one goes directly from the 
sensory areas to the amygdala.94 For Elster, identifying preconscious 
or unconscious emotion demonstrates an independence of affect and 
cognition. Ultimately, however, the discussion is “not centrally im-
portant” to his project; it does not adequately reflect the emotional 
experiences of everyday life.95 He is also not comfortable generalizing 
from these findings to all emotions (though he might be more com-
fortable if he looked to the substantial other evidence pointing to 
such rapid, preconscious emotional processing and influences96). 
 The other influential approach from philosophy is Martha Nuss-
baum’s theory of emotions, which also grounds them in judgments or 
beliefs. Hers is perhaps a more extreme perspective than others’, 
                                                                                                                    
 92. ELSTER, supra note 4, at 249-50; see id. at 254 (noting that cognitive antecedents 
of emotion include beliefs about one’s own emotions, probabilistic beliefs, and beliefs about 
others’ emotions, motivations, and beliefs). As a consequence, he argues, emotions may be 
rational or irrational when “well grounded in the evidence” or not. Id. at 250. Martha 
Nussbaum makes a similar point, arguing that emotions based on incorrect beliefs are 
“false” emotions. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 4, at 46. This contrasts 
sharply with some psychologists’ views, which suggest that “[c]ognitions can be evaluated 
for their correctness. . . . But preferences [and emotions] cannot be judged for accuracy or 
validity.” Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591, 597 
(Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998). 
 Parts of Elster’s approach, and the first part of Nussbaum’s account (described below), 
reflect a line of emotion research in the social sciences (social psychology in particular) 
called “appraisal theory,” which suggests that emotions proceed from a person’s subjective 
evaluations of his circumstances. For a detailed review of appraisal theory, see Phoebe C. 
Ellsworth & Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Processes in Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF 
AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 572. 
 93. First, he notes that the relationship between the cognitive antecedents and the 
emotional experience “is a matter of some controversy.” ELSTER, supra note 4, at 251. Sec-
ond, he notes that his discussion can help distinguish between whether someone is experi-
encing “an emotion or something else, such as a cognition.” Id. at 246. Third, he notes that 
this approach may not be able to account for certain emotional experiences such as music 
appreciation. Id. at 245. 
 94. Id. at 268. 
 95. Moreover, it convinces him that appraisal theory, see supra note 92, is false. Ap-
praisal theorists familiar with this objection, however, respond that the processes they sug-
gest do not preclude low-level, subcortical evaluations. E.g., Ellsworth & Scherer, supra 
note 92, at 585. 
 96. See Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate Over the Inde-
pendence of Affect, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION, 
supra note 5, at 31. 
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suggesting explicitly that emotions are cognitive judgments.97 What 
she means by this is, in part, that emotions involve “cognitive ap-
praisals or evaluations” (a relatively uncontroversial assumption98); 
but she also (in my view, overbroadly) implies that the very trans-
mission of perceptual information in the brain that leads to an emo-
tional experience renders the experience, at bottom, “cognitive.”99 
That is, for Professor Nussbaum, the visceral reaction Elster ex-
plained as showing that not all emotions have cognitive antecedents 
in fact shows that emotions are “cognitive.”100 
                                                                                                                    
 97. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT , supra note 4, at 37. This summary of Nuss-
baum’s work, of course, drastically simplifies her analysis, but, I think, accurately charac-
terizes her claim that emotions are at bottom “cognitive.” 
 98. See Ellsworth & Scherer, supra note 92. 
 99. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 4, at 4  (explicating her theory of 
emotions as, in part, suggesting that an emotion contains a “cognitive appraisal or evalua-
tion” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 114 (suggesting that “the transmission of information” 
along certain neural pathways (even pathways that bypass areas of conscious judgment) 
suggests a cognitive basis for that theory of emotions). It is possible this is simply a matter 
of semantics: James Averill, whom Nussbaum cites approvingly, id. at 151 n.20, has else-
where distinguished two meanings of “cognition.” See James R. Averill, Emotions as Epi-
sodic Dispositions, Cognitive Schemas, and Transitory Social Roles: Steps Toward an Inte-
grated Theory of Emotion, in 3a PERSPECTIVES IN PERSONALITY: SELF AND EMOTION 139, 
143-45 (D.J. Ozer et al. eds., 1990). The first is “intellective knowledge acquisition,” the 
conventional lay definition of cognition. Emotions are noncognitive under that view; that 
is, they are more value-laden, intuitive, and irrational. Emotions are “cognitive” in a sec-
ond, broader, sense, under Averill’s second definition (which may be similar to Nuss-
baum’s)—“any nonbehavioral mental activity.” They are thus “cognitive” in the sense of be-
ing “mental processes.” See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 455 
(2d ed. 1991). 
 100. Professor Nussbaum’s approach illustrates a tendency in legal discussions of the 
emotions to view them not only as conscious, but also as under conscious supervision or 
management of cognition. See Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 25-27 (noting this difficulty); 
Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 161-62 (noting the same). A recent re-
view of her work makes this point. Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychol-
ogy of Emotional Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and 
Practice, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1058 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING 
FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004)) (noting that Professor Nussbaum 
“does not address” in her book “the fact that disgust, like many emotions, is usually auto-
matic and unconscious”). Others have noted the management issue as well.  E.g., JOSEPH 
LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE 
19 (1996) (“While conscious control over emotions is weak, emotions can flood conscious-
ness. This is so because the wiring of the brain at this point in our evolutionary history is 
such that connections from the emotional systems to the cognitive systems are stronger 
than connections from the cognitive systems to the emotional systems.”); Seymour Epstein 
& Rosemary Pacini, Some Basic Issues Regarding Dual-Process Theories from the Perspec-
tive of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 462, 475 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (noting data “uniformly 
[showing] a direct influence of the [emotional] on the rational system, but not the reverse”); 
Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the Psychology of 
Conflict of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 192 (2004) (“ ‘[W]here [conscious] thought con-
flicts with emotions, the latter is designed by the neural circuitry in our brains to win’ ” 
(quoting RITA CARTER, MAPPING THE MIND 54 (1998))). 
 Another of Professor Elster’s examples illustrates this conscious/unconscious distinction. 
He discusses Norwegian workers in different industries: aluminum, fishing, and textile. In 
the former two, workers receive indirect wage subsidies; textiles workers receive direct 
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 Again, legal discussion of emotion often relies on Elster’s and 
Nussbaum’s work.101 Thus, to the extent that their approaches frame 
emotion as primarily conscious and cognitive, the legal discussion 
suffers too. For instance, Professor Sunstein’s book review of Paul 
Slovic’s volume on fear and the perception of risk was sharply criti-
cized as overcognitivizing the emotion of fear, reducing it solely to 
the cognitive evaluation of risky outcomes.102 Whether or not the 
criticism accurately portrayed Sunstein’s discussion,103 fear clearly 
cannot be merely such cognitive evaluation, as there are any number 
of varieties of that emotion. The fear one experiences when consider-
ing a nuclear power plant mishap is almost certainly different, 
physiologically and phenomenologically, from the fear one might ex-
perience over being caught cheating on an exam, or over receiving a 
low grade on that exam.104 And again, Joseph LeDoux’s work demon-
                                                                                                                    
wage subsidies. Elster argues that textiles workers feel envy for those working in the other 
two industries; those others, he implies, are proud not to be taking handouts, even though 
it is clear that their wages are being subsidized. He concludes that because the circum-
stances are framed differently—indirect versus direct subsidies—the emotions generated 
by the two situations are different: pride and shame. See ELSTER, supra note 4, at 252-53. 
 It is not clear, however, whether what the aluminum and fishing workers feel in reacting 
to the thought of the subsidies is in fact pride. It seems equally plausible that they recog-
nize that they too are receiving subsidies from the government and are ashamed, but re-
construe the situation to put a positive spin on it. In both cases, what is felt is shame. See 
id. at 252 (“[A]ccepting wage subsidies is perceived to be like begging.”). The other workers 
are conscious of that shame, though, and take steps to reframe the situation into one in 
which shame is less warranted (i.e., indirect versus direct subsidy). 
 The point is important. For the aluminum and fishing workers, it is not necessarily the 
case that their initial emotional reaction is pride. Indeed, it is likely that they, like the tex-
tile workers, initially feel shame. In a deliberate attempt to feel better, however, they try 
to “manage their feelings.” When an emotional experience and its cause are brought to con-
scious awareness and there is time and ability to do so—which is not always the case—
managing may be more possible. It is not the case, however, that emotions can be managed 
as easily as some commentators imply. Cf. Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 26 & n.189; Brian 
Rosebury, On Punishing Emotions, 16 RATIO JURIS 37, 43 (2003) (suggesting that certain 
psychological precursors of emotional judgments are “far less amenable . . . to conscious 
supervision”). 
 101. See supra note 4 and the sources cited supra note 90. 
 102. Moran, supra note 86, at 1-2. 
 103. Elsewhere, for instance, Professor Sunstein suggests that “[i]n the domain of 
risks, and most other places, emotional reactions are usually based on thinking; they are 
hardly cognition-free.” Sunstein, supra note 7, at 66. Moran is thus correct to suggest that 
Sunstein only “briefly touches on the biological foundation of fear and its relationship to 
higher cortical processes,” framing “emotion almost exclusively in relation to cognition.” 
Moran, supra note 86, at 4. Sunstein has elsewhere noted, however, that “ ‘affect’ [seems to 
come before risk or benefit assessments], and helps to ‘direct’ judgments of both risk and 
benefit.” Cass R. Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556, 
1564 (2004). He has also acknowledged the broader literature, for example, infra note 111, 
demonstrating that emotional responses often precede cognitive. Sunstein, Moral Heuris-
tics and Moral Framing, supra, at 1563. (“A great deal of recent attention has been paid to 
the fact that people often have a rapid, largely affective response to objects and situations, 
including job applicants, consumer products, animals, cars, and causes of action.”). But cf. 
infra note 105 (suggesting that in his other work, Professor Sunstein is less clear). 
 104. Cf. Zajonc, supra note 92, at 601. 
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strates physiological triggers of fear reactions even before cognitive 
or perceptual identification of the fear stimulus.105 Conversely of 
course, the perception of risk need not involve a fearful reaction or 
evaluation,106 even though affect might be at the base of many judg-
ments about emotionally-laden risky events.107 
 It is clear that there is some interaction and even integration be-
tween the cognitive or rational system and the emotional or experi-
ential system. But it is just as clear that what we refer to as emo-
tions are distinct from rational or cognitive judgments and deci-
sions—physiologically and phenomenologically, a “hot” state charac-
terized by the experience of emotion is different from a “cold” state, 
characterized by calm, cool, dispassionate, rational judgment.108 Sub-
stantial empirical evidence demonstrates the “independence of affect 
from cognition,”109 and, more importantly, the very different behavior 
to which the two states can lead.110 Similar to the neurological evi-
dence above, a variety of empirical studies demonstrates “affect pri-
macy,” showing that an emotional state precedes and orients a cogni-
tive state, often entirely outside of consciousness.111 Additional evi-
dence stems from the clear effect that incidental moods can have on 
                                                                                                                    
 105. LEDOUX, supra note 100.  Sunstein acknowledges this work. Sunstein, supra note 
11, at 1140 n.90 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 66 n.27 (“[S]ome types 
of emotions . . . can be triggered before the more cognitive sectors become involved at all.”). 
He continues without explanation in the latter, though, “[i]t is not true, however, that fear 
in human beings is generally precognitive or noncognitive, and even if it is in some cases, it 
is not clear that noncognitive fear would be triggered by most of the risks faced in everyday 
human lives.” Id. at 66 n.27. But cf. Sunstein, supra note 103, at 1564 (“ ‘[A]ffect’ [seems to 
come before risk or benefit assessments], and helps to ‘direct’ judgments of both risk and 
benefit.”).  
 106. E.g., Michael A. McCann, Economic Efficiency and Consumer Choice Theory in 
Nutritional Labeling, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1161 (documenting erroneous public perception of 
the health risks of eating fast food, though not in the context of emotional decisionmaking). 
 107. George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267 (2001). 
 108. Cf. Rottenstreich & Shu, supra note 4, at 458-59 (alluding to Loewenstein et al.’s 
work, supra note 107, to suggest that “[a]n extreme interpretation of [that research] would 
imply that there are two separate systems – an affective system and a perhaps more cogni-
tive system”). 
 109. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 3, at 397, 401. Psychologist Robert Za-
jonc has suggested fourteen fundamental differences between the two domains, including 
emotions’ cultural universality; the limited number of distinct emotions (as compared to an 
infinite number of distinct cognitions); the physiological primacy of emotional reactions; 
and the suggestion that cognitions are always “about something,” whereas emotions can 
exist without a direct referent (e.g., “free-floating anxiety”). Zajonc, supra note 92, at 596-
97. Jaak Panksepp, another leading emotion psychologist, also identifies several distinc-
tions between affective and cognitive processes. Jaak Panksepp, At the Interface of the Af-
fective, Behavioral, and Cognitive Neurosciences: Decoding the Emotional Feelings of the 
Brain, 52 BRAIN & COGNITION 4 (2003). 
 110. E.g., Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 267 (“[Empirical data] show that emo-
tional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. 
When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior.”). See supra note 
100; infra Part III.C. 
 111. See generally Zajonc, supra note 92; Zajonc, supra note 96. 
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judgments and decisionmaking. A vast empirical literature demon-
strates such effect on numerous social judgments, including legal and 
moral decisions.112 Finally, striking evidence for two phenomenologi-
cally distinct systems comes from empirical studies showing that due 
to emotion and “gut” feelings, people behave as though certain low-
probability events are less probable when represented by equivalent 
ratios of smaller numbers (1 in 10) than of larger numbers (10 in 
100).113 That is, people saw the likelihood of Event X as greater when 
the probability was expressed as a 10 in 100 chance than when it was 
expressed as 1 in 10, and behaved accordingly. Even more striking, 
people behaved similarly when the other ratio for Event X ranged be-
tween 5 and 9 in 100.114 That is, despite objective information that 
Event X had, for instance, a 7 out of 100 chance of occurring versus a 
1 in 10 chance, respondents chose and behaved as though the former 
were more likely. Respondents explained that rationally and objec-
tively, they understood that the likelihood was lower; emotionally 
and subjectively, however, they felt they had a better chance when 
the absolute likelihood appeared higher (i.e., 7 chances rather than 
1), and thus actually chose as though they had a better chance of ob-
taining X under those circumstances.115 Moreover, this tendency to 
respond nonoptimally was correlated with increased real-life gam-
bling behavior. 
                                                                                                                    
 112. For sources reviewing the extensive empirical data on the influence of incidental 
mood on other social and interpersonal judgments, see sources cited supra note 5. For ex-
perimental evidence of incidental mood’s influence on moral judgments, see Blumenthal, 
Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4 (collecting studies and reporting new data). 
 113. E.g., Lee A. Kirkpatrick & Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory 
and Subjective Probability: Further Evidence for Two Conceptual Systems, 63 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 534 (1992). 
 114. Veronika Denes-Raj & Seymour Epstein, Conflict Between Intuitive and Rational 
Processing: When People Behave Against Their Better Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 819, 821-23 (1994); see Epstein & Pacini, supra note 100, at 466. In the Denes-
Raj and Epstein experiment, subjects were presented with two rectangular platters of col-
ored jellybeans. The small platter always contained 1 red and 9 white jellybeans; the large 
platter contained between 5 and 9 red jellybeans, and the remainder white to total 100. 
Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra, at 821. Subjects were instructed that by picking a red jelly-
bean they would either win $1.00 (win trial) or lose $1.00 (lose trial). Though each platter 
was clearly labeled with the relevant proportion, such knowledge had little effect on many 
respondents’ behavior. 
 There may be a connection between these findings and empirical research on the effect of 
framing a question as involving either frequencies (e.g., 10 out of 100) or probabilities (e.g., 
10%), although the possibility has to my knowledge not been investigated. The different 
framing may affect the perception of the likelihood involved by influencing the associated 
emotional reaction. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Com-
munication: The Effects of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing 
Probability Versus Frequency Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271 (2000). 
 115. Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 114, at 823; Epstein & Pacini, supra note 100, at 
466. 
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 At bottom, I do not at all want to argue that there is a clearly de-
marcated break between cognition and emotion.116 But there are im-
portant differences between emotion and cognition that have conse-
quences for paternalistic intervention. First and most important, 
people clearly behave differently when in “hot” and “cold” states, and 
even as the result of feelings they recognize as irrational. Second, 
emotion does have cognitive elements, in the sense of appraisals and 
identification of stimuli. But emotional reactions can often be 
quicker, outside consciousness, more automatic, less analytic, and 
less controllable, and need not always include such appraisal. The 
manageability of emotions may therefore be different than that of 
cognition.117 
B.   Cognitive Biases and Implications for Paternalism 
 Most of the previous discussion of paternalism and social science 
has thus been in the context of cognitive biases, the traditional line of 
heuristics and biases that affect judgments and decisionmaking.118 
Commentators have cited a number of these biases as potentially, or 
actually, warranting third-party intervention in the decisionmaking 
process in order to protect individuals from such poor judgments. For 
instance, Sunstein discusses the “availability heuristic,” which leads 
individuals to mispredict the frequency or likelihood of easily imag-
ined events, because the ease with which such an example is gener-
ated leads one to believe that it is common or likely.119 At a general 
level, he suggests that: 
[a]n understanding of [this] heuristic bears directly on the debate 
over paternalistic interventions. If people believe that some risks 
are much higher than they actually are and that other risks are 
much lower than they actually are, their behavior will not promote 
their welfare. People will take excessive precautions to avoid triv-
ial risks and they will fail to protect themselves against genuine 
hazards. Government has a legitimate role to play here; at a 
minimum, it should correct false beliefs. In some cases, govern-
ment legitimately responds to people’s inability to process risk-
                                                                                                                    
 116. Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere that too sharp a distinction can be misleading. 
Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 25. 
 117. Of course, there is more automatic, less conscious cognition as well. See, e.g., 
Daniel M. Wegner & John A. Bargh, Control and Automaticity in Social Life, in HANDBOOK 
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 92, at 446; Daniel T. Gilbert et al., On Cognitive Busy-
ness: When Person Perceivers Meet Persons Perceived, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
733 (1988). 
 118. Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychological Case, supra note 9, gives a good review, from 
which I draw here. 
 119. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1127 (1974) (identifying and explaining the availability heuristic); 
Jolls et al., supra note 3, at 1477 (“[T]he frequency of some event is estimated by judging 
how easy it is to recall other instances of this type . . . .”). 
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related information by constraining their choices, at least when 
the constraint ensures that they will do what they would do if they 
were adequately informed.120 
More specifically, the availability heuristic may lead to investors’ 
overreliance on media reports of atypical investor success, and a be-
lief that such success is there for the taking.121 Such “irrational exu-
berance,” to coin a cliché, may warrant third-party intervention to 
dampen investors’ ardor.122 Similarly, because breach of contract 
tends overall to be atypical, contracting parties might be vulnerable 
to the heuristic and mispredict the likelihood of breach (either over-
estimating or underestimating), leading some commentators to sug-
gest intervention.123 In quite another context, Elizabeth Scott has 
suggested that the availability heuristic is “the type of cognitive error 
most likely to distort premarital decisions,” and is therefore one justi-
fication for developing precommitment strategies for individuals con-
sidering marriage.124 
 Other cognitive biases have also led to calls for third-party inter-
vention to protect individuals from their own decisionmaking. The 
                                                                                                                    
 120. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Available? Social Influences and Behavioral Economics, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1302-03 (2003); cf. Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Rein-
venting the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 60-62 (1995). 
 121. Henry T. C. Hu, Illiteracy and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual 
Funds, and the Matter of Asset Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2369 (1996). 
 122. Id. (recommending government and/or regulatory intervention to remedy irra-
tional investment tendencies). 
 123. One commentator condones judicial reluctance to enforce liquidated damages 
clauses, in part because of the availability heuristic. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emer-
gence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1743, 1784 (2000). Eisenberg suggests, in 
part, that the typical absence of breach leads contracting parties to view contract fulfill-
ment as the most available, and thus likely, outcome; therefore, the party will only under-
estimate the likelihood of a liquidated damages clause coming into play and therefore not 
fully evaluate the clause. See id. Indeed, one scholar suggests that courts behave so in any 
case. Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: The 
Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717, 735 (2000). In contrast, another au-
thor suggests that recent experience with a breach will lead a contracting party to over-
predict that likelihood in the present contract, leading the author to emphasize “supra-
compensatory” (i.e., liquidated or punitive) damages as a remedy. Larry A. DiMatteo, A 
Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 
633, 705 (2001). 
 124. Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. 
L. REV. 9, 63-64 (1990). Interestingly, Professor Scott frames the decisions about marriage 
and divorce as subject to cognitive errors such as the availability heuristic and cognitive 
dissonance, rather than emotional factors. She explicitly notes that these cognitive biases 
will only influence decisionmaking to the extent the decision process “is influenced by a 
calculation of costs.” Id. at 44. Thus, she suggests, “[I]f the decision is based primarily on 
emotional impulse, then precommitment mechanisms would not function as predicted.” Id. 
at 44 n.98. Professor Scott suggests that research from social psychology lends support to 
the notion that calculation of costs is involved in some of the relevant decisionmaking. Id. 
at 48 (“There is consensus that the individual considering divorce usually undertakes a 
cost-benefit calculation, comparing continued marriage with divorce.”). 
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“hindsight bias”125 may lead investors to overweight stocks’ past per-
formance in predicting future performance, leading to poor invest-
ment decisions;126 again, such tendencies may warrant intervention 
into investors’ decisionmaking.127 The false consensus effect, or the 
tendency to project one’s own beliefs, attitudes, and character traits 
onto others, may lead to trust in inappropriate circumstances; for in-
stance, an honest individual’s likelihood to enter into an unfair con-
tract because he simply assumes that the other party is equally 
trustworthy.128 Many such cognitive biases with the potential to lead 
to manipulated and/or inefficient contracts have led commentators to 
recommend stricter guidelines on who may enter into what contracts 
on which terms—approving of, or recommending more, paternalistic 
oversight of the market.129 
 Finally, overoptimism could lead to inaccurate perception of vari-
ous risks or skills: drivers may neglect to wear seat belts or motorcy-
cle helmets, for instance, due to inflated views of their own driving 
skills; such inaccurate perceptions might plausibly lead to paternal-
                                                                                                                    
 125. Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288 (1975) (documenting 
bias). The bias is notoriously difficult to avoid or to correct. E.g., Scott A. Hawkins & Reid 
Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 311 (1990) (discussing difficulty of avoiding hindsight bias ); Kim A. 
Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995) (empirically demonstrating the difficulty of avoiding and 
correcting bias); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind-
sight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 586-88 (1998) (discussing difficulty of correcting hindsight 
bias). As sketched below, however, doing so is not impossible. See infra note 296. 
 126. Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 815, 844 n.105 (2001) (“[I]nvestors may act with ‘hindsight bias,’ placing too much 
weight on past performance in projecting future performance.”). Nominally, Professor Choi 
makes this point in the context of arguments against investor regulation. Id. at 843-44. 
However, he points out that the danger of cognitive biases exists under the current, non-
regulated regulatory system, and that the sort of regulation he proposes may help counter 
such biases. Id. at 844. 
 127. See supra notes 121-22. Note that this is different from the much more common 
instances where documenting the hindsight bias calls for limits on judges’ or juries’ deci-
sionmaking. E.g., Hal R. Arkes & Cindy A. Schipani, Medical Malpractice v. the Business 
Judgment Rule: Differences in Hindsight Bias, 73 OR. L. REV. 587, 630 (1994) (suggesting a 
bifurcated trial); Jolls et al., supra note 3, at 1527 (suggesting manipulation of the infor-
mation given to jurors); Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 606 (suggesting changing the stan-
dard of proof). There, under my present definition, such limits are not “paternalistic,” as 
they do not directly protect an individual from her own biased decisions; rather, they pro-
tect a defendant or the integrity of the judicial process from such biases. Cf. Blumenthal, 
Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 235 (making this distinction more generally). 
 128. E.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud Litigation: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337, 365 (using this example as one of several 
demonstrating importance of emphasizing tort-based regulation of securities fraud, rather 
than contract-based). 
 129. E.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 279, 300 (2000) (suggesting, in part based on discussion of cognitive errors, 
regulating access to investments). 
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istic intervention such as the installation of air bags regardless of the 
consumer’s wishes.130 
 Again, these are simply selected examples of cognitive biases iden-
tified by social scientists that have encouraged legal commentators in 
a number of contexts to make policy recommendations designed to 
protect individuals from the consequences of those biases. Emotional 
biases, however, have been discussed in less depth in the legal pater-
nalism context; the next section begins to address that gap. 
C.   Emotional Biases and Implications for Paternalism 
1.   Framework and Distinctions 
 Low-level, basic emotions are essential, adaptive, rapid, and effi-
cient. An important function is to orient us toward dangerous or 
other personally salient stimuli.131 Sometimes, however, such orien-
tation leads to mistakenly identifying that salient stimulus as dan-
gerous, under an evolutionarily adaptive “better-safe-than-sorry” ap-
proach. When that happens, an individual avoids something that 
might be beneficial, thus reducing welfare. Moreover, “free-floating” 
or incidental affect—affect unrelated to a judgment or decision at 
hand—can sometimes bias a decision or decisionmaking process.132 
Emotion related to or evoked by a particular stimulus may also affect 
judgments and decisions relating to it. For all of these reasons, emo-
tions are “a potential source of biased judgment and reckless ac-
tion.”133 In this section I review some of the affective (emotional) bi-
ases that empirical research has identified, connecting them to legal 
and policy circumstances and highlighting the potential each raises 
for paternalistic intervention.134 
 Three distinctions will be especially relevant in this discussion. 
First, I distinguish between judgments and decisions involving (or 
                                                                                                                    
 130. E.g., Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1753 (1998) (noting that where failure to wear seat belts stems from 
cognitive limitations, “an appropriate social corrective may take the decision about safety 
restraints out of the hands of the drivers and passengers and mandate the installation of 
passive restraints (such as air bags) that operate independently of any judgment made by 
those in the motor vehicle”). 
 131. Jorge L. Armony et al., Computational Modeling of Emotion: Explorations 
Through the Anatomy and Physiology of Fear Conditioning, 1 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 
28, 33 (1997); Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 268. 
 132. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 133. George F. Loewenstein & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role of Affect in Decision Mak-
ing, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 619, 620. 
 134. In some instances, law and policy have already “intervened,” recognizing, for in-
stance, the usefulness of “cooling-off periods.” See Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1238-47 
(discussing such interventions); infra Part IV.B.3 (evaluating effectiveness of cooling-off 
periods). Similarly, in limited circumstances courts have recognized the difficulty of fore-
seeing future emotions. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 209-14 (dis-
cussing surrogate mothering contracts). 
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based on, or predicting) emotions or emotional reactions,135 and ones 
influenced by emotions at the time of judgment or decision.136 This 
distinction connects closely with the question of intervening to cor-
rect emotional biases: as discussed more fully in Part IV.B, one (diffi-
cult) way to alleviate cognitive biases—for some people, for some 
judgments, and in some circumstances137—is to draw an individual’s 
attention to the potential bias.138 The evidence is less clear for emo-
tional biases, but it seems as though such intervention would succeed 
differently for the two sorts of judgments—less successful for ones 
involving or predicting emotions, more so for ones made under the in-
fluence of some affect. 
 Second, a useful distinction may be drawn between emotional bi-
ases stemming from active manipulation by others and ones result-
ing from the simple operation of biases and heuristics.139 Some cases 
of emotional bias—in the realms of consumer decisions, family plan-
ning, or politics—reflect efforts to deliberately manipulate decisions 
by inducing emotions/moods that the manipulator hopes will bias de-
cisionmaking.140 Other cases, though, involve natural biases or er-
                                                                                                                    
 135. For instance, general judgments about expected utility, consumer judgments 
about preferences, or predictions of emotion to be experienced—“affective forecasting.” See 
Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4. 
 136. For instance, the influence of concurrently experienced mood that is nevertheless 
unrelated to the judgment at hand. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 5. The distinction is 
similar to that made recently by George Loewenstein and colleagues between “expected” 
and “immediate” emotions, and their similar distinction between “anticipated” and “antici-
patory” emotions. For the distinction between expected and immediate emotions, see 
Loewenstein & Lerner, supra note 133, at 620. For the similar distinction between antici-
pated and anticipatory emotions, see Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 267-68. The 
first in each of Loewenstein’s pairs are emotions that are predicted to occur in the future, 
typically as the consequence of some decision outcome. The second reflects the influence of 
affect experienced concurrently with the decision or judgment being made and would in-
clude both those incidental mood effects noted above and effects stemming from emotion 
related to the judgment task.  
 137. The existence of individual differences in cognitive and emotional biases has led to 
some contention in the academic discussion. Compare Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and 
Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ 
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) (suggesting that individual differences in sus-
ceptibility to such biases lessens the usefulness of behavioral law and economics’ policy 
suggestions), with Prentice, supra note 2, at 1722-44 (countering Mitchell’s criticisms). See 
also Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 28-30 (discussing implications of individual differences 
for legal policy); Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, supra note 9 (discussing implications of indi-
vidual differences for paternalistic policies). 
 138. Infra Part IV.B. 
 139. Paul Slovic et al., Rational Actors or Rational Fools: Implications of the Affect 
Heuristic for Behavioral Economics, 31 J. SOCIO-ECON. 329, 337 (2002). 
 140. E.g., Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22 (noting po-
tential for emotional manipulation in context of abortion decisionmaking); Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipula-
tion, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1444 (1999) (“ ‘[Atmospheric] factors . . . may be designed 
into or manipulated within retail spaces in order to produce emotional and, in turn, behav-
ioral effects in consumers.’ ” (quoting GORDON R. FOXALL & RONALD E. GOLDSMITH, 
CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY FOR MARKETING 189 (1994)); Marrow, supra note 43, at 26-34 
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rors, such as the tendency to make different judgments or evalua-
tions when in a good mood versus a bad mood.141 Obviously the first 
is designed to capitalize on the second, but distinguishing them may 
suggest different views on the propriety of paternalism. People are 
likely more receptive to paternalistic policies designed to protect 
against one party taking advantage of another’s tendencies toward 
emotional bias, such as advertisers’ manipulation of emotion or un-
conscionable contract practices. However, people are likely less re-
ceptive to policies designed to guard against their own, especially un-
conscious, biases, seeing such policies as more intrusive than the 
former. Moreover, different policies or interventions—for instance, ex 
ante versus ex post—may be warranted depending on which sort of 
bias is to be corrected, and those different interventions may them-
selves be differently successful. For instance, ex ante intervention 
may be appropriate for naturally occurring biases, but these may be 
less successful than ex post intervention, such as by a court. 
 Third, for a number of empirical reasons, it is useful to distin-
guish between positive and negative emotions, as well as among dif-
ferent types of positive and negative emotions.142 Emotional proc-
esses, and thus the biases they may cause or be involved with, seem 
to differ based on the emotion’s valence. For instance, people are 
relatively inaccurate at predicting the intensity and duration of their 
emotional reactions to future events.143 However, people are actually 
better at predicting reactions to positive experiences than to negative 
ones (or, at least, not as inaccurate).144 On the other hand, when we 
do make mistakes regarding future reactions to positive events (e.g., 
overestimating how much utility we will derive from such an event), 
we are not likely to learn from those mistakes;145 but it is not clear 
                                                                                                                    
(identifying instances of contractual manipulation by taking advantage of cognitive and af-
fective or “experiential” factors, although the discussion is primarily framed in terms of 
cognitive biases); Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages 
Clause: A Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 90-95 
(2001) (containing a similar discussion); Daniel N. Shaviro, Exchange on Public Choice, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 834, 836 (1990) (commenting on the article by Herbert Hovenkamp, Legis-
lation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 63 (1990), and noting the ability 
of “politicians to manipulate [voters] with potent emotional symbols (ranging from race to 
‘competitiveness’ to the flag) that often are only weakly related to underlying substance”); 
Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092, 
2102 (1996) (“Consumers in the market for infertility treatment may be especially vulner-
able to emotional manipulation . . . .”). 
 141. See infra Part III.C.2. 
 142. Most discussion of law and the emotions has focused on negative emotions. See 
George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. ECON. 
REV. 426, 426 n.1 (2000). 
 143. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4. 
 144. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 626 (1998). 
 145. See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Lessons from the Past: Do People Learn From Ex-
perience that Emotional Reactions are Short-Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
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whether we learn from erroneous predictions about negative emo-
tions.146 In other contexts, it appears that some corrective measures 
(again, such as drawing an individual’s attention to her current 
mood) may be differentially successful for positive and negative mood 
biases.147 More broadly, it has long been known that people in posi-
tive and negative moods process information differently, are differ-
ently persuadable, and articulate different attitudes, beliefs, and 
opinions.148 Accordingly, in developing interventions, we may need to 
take into account different effects of positive and negative emotional 
contexts.149 
2.   Types of Emotional Biases 
 The distinctions sketched above illustrate that applying empirical 
research to the paternalism question is more nuanced than previous 
discussions might suggest. The following discussion identifies a 
number of emotional biases, using these distinctions as an organizing 
                                                                                                                    
BULL. 1648 (2001); see also Norbert Schwarz, Emotion, Cognition, and Decision Making, 14 
COGNITION & EMOTION 433, 437 (2000) (“Given individuals’ general difficulties with the 
prediction of future feelings, one may hope that extensive experience with an affect-
eliciting situation would increase the validity of predictions pertaining to future similar 
situations. Unfortunately, this hope is unwarranted . . . and memories of past feelings are 
themselves subject to systematic biases.”). 
 146. Wilson et al., supra note 145, at 1650. 
 147. See Gerald J. Gorn et al., Mood, Awareness, and Product Evaluation, 2 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 237 (1993) (drawing attention to mood state corrects bias for positive 
but not negative moods); Norbert Schwarz & Gerald Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and 
Judgments of Well-Being: Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513 (1983) (showing an opposite pattern). 
 148. See Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 50 (citing sources). 
 149. Similarly, we should distinguish within positive and negative emotions, that is, 
among different kinds of each. Traditionally, emotion research focused broadly on the ef-
fects of positive versus negative emotion. But increasingly, evidence shows that different 
emotions of the same valence can have quite different effects on cognitive processes. See 
David DeSteno et al., Beyond Valence in the Perception of Likelihood: The Role of Emotion 
Specificity, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397 (2000); Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher 
Keltner, Beyond Valence: Toward a Model of Emotion-Specific Influences on Judgement  
and Choice, 14 COGNITION & EMOTION 473, 474-76 (2000); Larissa Z. Tiedens & Susan Lin-
ton, Judgment Under Emotional Certainty and Uncertainty: The Effects of Specific Emo-
tions on Information Processing, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 973 (2001). The 
negative emotions of fear, anger, sadness, and anxiety, for instance, can all lead to differ-
ent risk perceptions, different likelihood estimates, and different influences of emotion. 
See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 146 (2001). And, of course, emotions of the same valence differ in their 
physiology, e.g., Robert W. Levenson, Autonomic Nervous System Differences Among Emo-
tions, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 23 (1992), and their phenomenology. These differences show that 
care need be taken in applying empirical emotion research to law and policy, as findings 
from some studies may not generalize to the legal context in question. Peter H. Huang, 
Moody Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Materiality of Information and the 
Reasonableness of Investors, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 130 (2005) (“[I]n light of the find-
ing that affective states of the same valence have distinct, predictable influences on per-
suasion, decision making, and motivation, how should the legal system account for specific 
emotions?”). 
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framework. Specifically, in sections (a) and (b), I identify biases in-
volving judgment about emotions and biases resulting from the in-
fluence of concurrently experienced emotion. In section (c) I briefly 
note the likelihood that detrimental decisionmaking based on such 
judgments may easily stem from the manipulation by others of the 
biases documented. For each example, I sketch some suggestions 
that have been or could be made for paternalistic interventions; both 
here and in the next Part, I address the potential success of such 
policies. 
 (a)   Biases Involving Judgments About Emotions 
 i)   Affective Forecasting 
 Surprisingly, although people are fairly good at predicting the va-
lence of our future emotions, we are actually quite inaccurate when 
asked to predict the intensity and the duration of the emotional reac-
tion.150 In part this is because our predictions are often about unfa-
miliar events; and in part it is because we simply do not consider as-
pects of both ourselves and the outside world that, over time, tend to 
ameliorate the intensity and duration of emotional reactions. Suscep-
tibility to such prediction errors has implications for medical deci-
sionmaking,151 jury decisionmaking,152 contract law,153 negotiation,154 
tax policy,155 surrogate mothering,156 custody and use of frozen em-
bryos,157 risk and other regulation,158 and other contexts. 
                                                                                                                    
 150. See generally Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4; see also Chris 
Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation Behavior, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 85-86 (noting individuals’ inability to predict how they will feel in the 
future); Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on Negotiation, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (2004) (recognizing social science literature on affective fore-
casting); Mark Kelman, Law and Behavioral Science: Conceptual Overviews, 97 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1347, 1356 (2003) (“Consider also the important point made by behavioral social sci-
entists who investigate hedonics: individuals invariably make concrete choices and estab-
lish short-term behavioral plans in expectation that the choices they make will make them 
happier than the ones they forego, but they may for a variety of reasons know very little 
about what has made them happy or will make them happy.”); George Loewenstein & 
David Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85 (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds., 1999); Leaf Van 
Boven & Joanne Kane, Predicting Feelings Versus Choices, in JUDGMENTS OVER TIME: THE 
INTERPLAY OF THOUGHTS, FEELINGS, AND BEHAVIORS 67 (Lawrence J. Sanna & Edward C. 
Chang eds., 2006) (reviewing such research). 
 151. E.g., Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 217-25. 
 152. Id. at 182-92 (discussing how prediction errors influence jury decisionmaking 
within various contexts). 
 153. Id. at 214 (discussing how prediction errors affect contract duties and liabilities). 
 154. Guthrie & Sally, supra note 150, at 821-27. 
 155. See Diane M. Ring, Why Happiness?: A Commentary on Griffith’s Progressive 
Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1413 (2004). 
 156. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 209-14; Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1934 (1987) (“[P]erformance of surrogacy 
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 In some of these legal and policy contexts, paternalism might be 
involved when a third party needs to intervene in order to privilege 
one set of an individual’s preferences (Time1) or the other (Time2), or 
in order to protect an individual from the nonoptimal consequences 
to which biased decisionmaking might lead. Perhaps an obvious ap-
plication is legislation outlawing suicide or limiting or prohibiting 
requests for euthanasia, based on observations by policymakers that 
individuals’ preferences for such steps are likely to be emotionally bi-
ased.159 On the other hand, such research may also point to a de-
creased need for paternalistic steps. For instance, Chris Guthrie has 
noted the relevance of affective forecasting research to governmental 
regulatory action in anticipation of some possible negative event (for 
example, terrorism or epidemics). He suggests that because actual 
harms may be less than anticipated harms, government infringe-
ment on autonomy, liberty, and other rights may be less warranted 
than it at first appears.160 Further, government intervention to pro-
tect against decisionmaking biases might be less warranted if the ac-
tual harms that ensue from the biases are less than might be antici-
pated. 
 A more speculative context involves the emerging discussion of 
memory- and emotion-dampening drugs.161 Pharmacological research 
demonstrates that the drug propranolol can, in part, decrease the in-
tensity of emotions associated with particular events.162 These find-
ings may make those who have experienced traumatic events inter-
ested in taking propranolol, with the goal of “therapeutic forgetting.” 
In a recent article, Adam Kolber discusses several of the legal and 
ethical issues arising from the possibility of such induced forgetting, 
addressing as well responses by the Presidential Council on Bioethics 
that were largely antipathetic to its use. Relevant here are a number 
of concerns by the Council, summarized by Professor Kolber as fol-
lows: memory dampening may “(1) prevent us from truly coming to 
terms with trauma, (2) tamper with our identities, leading us to a 
false sense of happiness, (3) demean the genuineness of human life 
and experience, (4) encourage us to forget memories that we are obli-
gated to keep, and (5) inure us to the pain of others.”163 Although the 
                                                                                                                    
agreements by willing parties should be permitted, but women who change their minds 
should not be forced to perform.”). 
 157. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 215-17. 
 158. E.g., Chris Guthrie, Risk Realization, Emotion, and Policy Making, 69 MO. L. REV. 
1039 (2004) (discussing how predictive errors put policy makers in an awkward position). 
 159. Cf. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 217-22 (discussing applica-
tions of affective forecasting research to euthanasia and advance directives). 
 160. Guthrie, supra note 158, at 1044-45. 
 161. See Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications 
of Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006). 
 162. Id. at 1574-77. 
 163. Id. at 1565-66. 
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Council did not directly call for prohibitions on the use of propranolol 
for therapeutic forgetting, these concerns demonstrate a clear skepti-
cism and at least the potential for future attempts at paternalistic 
regulation. 
 Errors in affective forecasting are relevant to such a discussion. 
Again, individuals typically mispredict their future emotional reac-
tions, typically overestimating the intensity and duration of those 
emotional states; such mispredictions are typically stronger for nega-
tive emotions than for positive. And again, in part this is because we 
underestimate our ability to cope with traumatic events. To the ex-
tent that this is so, the demand for memory dampening might be too 
high; people may overestimate the need to forget negative emotions 
by underestimating the degree to which those emotions will dissipate 
naturally over time.164 The Council or other government actors might 
seek to use the affective forecasting research as a basis for paternal-
istically regulating the use of propranolol, in an effort to overcome 
arguments such as Professor Kolber’s that are based, in part, on 
autonomy.165 
 ii)   The Endowment Effect 
 The endowment effect (EE), or the tendency to experience a 
“warm glow of ownership” and value a good or entitlement more 
highly when it is possessed, is a robust effect considered to signifi-
cantly undercut basic assumptions of law and economics.166 Tradi-
tional law and economics predicts that an individual’s willingness to 
pay for a good should match her willingness to sell that good, and 
thus that the asking price and offer price should match. This predic-
tion reflects basic assumptions underlying the Coase Theorem as 
well.167 Nevertheless, the prediction has been shown false in a num-
ber of experimental and real-life settings; the price that individuals 
tend to demand to sell a good that they own is significantly higher 
                                                                                                                    
 164. I do not discuss the application to those suffering from post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD), which Professor Kolber discusses as a potential use for therapeutic forget-
ting. The affective forecasting literature has focused primarily on “healthy” subjects, that 
is, not on those suffering diagnosed disorders. Professor Kolber does address some of these 
issues. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 161, at 1567-71. 
 165. Id. at 1566-67 (suggesting that the Council’s arguments provide relatively weak 
grounds for wide-ranging legal restrictions on memory dampening and do not justify a 
broad legal restriction on the use of memory-dampening drugs and that “heavy-handed 
government prohibition of memory dampening is inappropriate”). I do not take a stand on 
the issue, but rather note the potential for paternalism raised by the convergence of the af-
fective forecasting research and Professor Kolber’s discussion of therapeutic forgetting. 
 166. Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1326-29 (1990). 
 167. Id. 
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than the amount they would be willing to offer to buy it.168 The effect 
is generally attributed to “loss aversion,” where to lose something of 
a given magnitude causes a larger decrease in utility than the in-
crease in utility that gaining a good of that magnitude would 
cause.169 
 This effect—considered by some the most important empirical 
contribution that behavioral law and economics has made170—stems 
in large part from emotional, as opposed to cognitive, factors. A re-
cent review of why the EE occurs emphasized four potential explana-
tions, all with emotional underpinnings: (1) “pure” loss aversion, 
where to lose something “simply hurts more” than not receiving it—
an illogical bias that simply reflects “difference[s] in emotional con-
tent;” (2) “attachment,” where simply owning an entitlement adds 
value, sentimental or otherwise, over and above the entitlement’s 
pure “commodity status;” (3) a “regret avoidance” hypothesis, reflect-
ing the notion that “giving up an entitlement is more likely to cause 
future regret than not obtaining an entitlement;” and (4) the “dis-
utility” of selling, where simply participating in a sale of the entitle-
ment causes dysphoria, especially when that sale involves inappro-
priately commodifying that entitlement.171 As an empirical matter, 
such reluctance to commodify, or preference for nonfungible posses-
sions, does seem to underlie many of the EE findings: two recent 
meta-analytic reviews of EE studies demonstrated that the less a 
possession is like an “ordinary market good,” the more likely it is 
that the EE will occur.172 Recent experimental research lends further 
                                                                                                                    
 168. Id. For reviews of studies, see John K. Horowitz & Kenneth E. McConnell, A Re-
view of WTA / WTP Studies, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 426 (2002) (reviewing forty-five 
studies); Serdar Sayman & Ayşe Öncüler, Effects of Study Design Characteristics on the 
WTA-WTP Disparity: A Meta Analytical Framework, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 289 (2005) (re-
viewing thirty-nine studies). 
 169. Kahneman et al., supra note 166, at 1326-27; Russell Korobkin, The Endowment 
Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1250 (2003); Leaf Van Boven et al., 
Egocentric Empathy Gaps Between Owners and Buyers: Misperceptions of the Endowment 
Effect, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 66, 66 (2000). 
 170. E.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1735 (1998); Korobkin, supra note 169, at 1229. 
 171. Id. at 1250-55. 
 172. Horowitz & McConnell, supra note 168, at 427 (reviewing forty-five studies and 
finding that EE is highest for nonmarket goods and lowest for various forms of money, 
with “ordinary private goods” falling somewhere in between); Sayman & Öncüler, supra 
note 168, at 304 tbl.2 (reviewing thirty-nine studies and finding that similarity of good to 
“market good” was negatively correlated with strength of EE, and “perceived illegitimacy” 
of transaction was positively correlated with strength of EE); see also Kahneman et al., su-
pra note 166, at 1344 (noting that EE reflects an unwillingness to sell, but little unwilling-
ness to buy, suggesting that what is involved is parting with a good, rather than with 
money). More precisely, the meta-analyses reviewed studies examining the disparity be-
tween the willingness to pay for a good or entitlement and the willingness to accept some 
compensation for that same good or entitlement. The endowment effect reflects that dis-
parity. See, e.g., id. at 1342 (“The endowment effect is one explanation for the systematic 
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credence to the role of emotional reactions or regret avoidance in the 
EE, finding a correlation between the perceived “importance” of a 
possession and the degree of loss aversion.173 Because potential mar-
ket participants’ EE or disparity between willingness to pay and will-
ingness to accept leads to undertrading and thus likely market ineffi-
ciencies, third-party intervention to attenuate the effect might be ap-
propriate.174 
 Alternatively, intervention might be designed (in good faith or 
not) in order to take advantage of the EE. Good faith intervenors 
might provide goods to individuals precisely because their initial 
preferences will be changed once they own that good.175 The obverse, 
a less innocuous step, might be to provide individuals with a good 
less valuable than they might deserve or desire, under the assump-
tion that through the EE and other mechanisms they will come to 
value it more.176 
 Note that an underexplored issue, amenable to empirical investi-
gation, involves the interaction between these two emotional effects: 
affective forecasting and the endowment effect. For instance, is the 
pain of losing an owned good (or the utility of maintaining posses-
sion) less than we anticipate?177 Furthermore, if we realized this, how 
might it affect our selling price? To what extent, then, might educa-
tional intervention attenuate the endowment effect? 
 iii)   Probability Neglect 
 As noted above in Part III.A, Seymour Epstein and colleagues 
have documented differences between what they call the “cognitive” 
system (rational maximizing analysis) and the “experiential” system 
(intuitive, emotional analysis). In particular, they noted the differ-
ences in judgment and behavior to which the two systems can lead, 
and the likelihood of nonoptimal outcomes when the latter system is 
used.178 Substantial other empirical evidence shows probability ne-
glect—when a judgment about the outcome of a particular action is 
                                                                                                                    
differences between buying and selling prices that have been observed so often in past 
work.”). 
 173. See Eric J. Johnson et al., Exploring the Nature of Loss Aversion 23-24 (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). 
 174. Sunstein, supra note 49, at 1172 (arguing that the endowment effect and related 
biases may support “considerable legislative and judicial intrusion into private preference 
structures”). 
 175. Id. at 1152. 
 176. Or, “the legal system might remove goods from someone who currently has them, 
even if that person values those goods, in the expectation that he might not miss them af-
ter they have been taken.” Id. 
  177. For some such research, see George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the 
Prediction of Tastes, 105 ECON. J. 929 (1995). 
 178. See Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 114; Epstein & Pacini, supra note 100; 
Kirkpatrick & Epstein, supra note 113. 
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accompanied by strong emotion, or is otherwise heavily affect-laden, 
people’s decisions about those outcomes are relatively impervious to 
changes in the probability of the outcome.179 Traditional expected-
utility theory predicts that decisions should be relatively sensitive to 
outcome probability—that is, the utility of a particular outcome 
should be weighted by the likelihood that it will occur. The data, 
however, show that when an outcome is emotionally-laden, and espe-
cially when that outcome is vivid or made especially salient, people 
are highly insensitive to variations in probability. 
 In one study, for instance, subjects were asked to report the high-
est amount of money that they would pay to avoid a particular un-
pleasant outcome that occurred with varying degrees of likelihood.180 
The unpleasant outcome was either fairly neutral (the loss of $20) or 
vividly unpleasant (a brief but painful electrical shock). Subjects pre-
sented with varying possibilities of a $20 loss varied relatively pre-
dictably with the likelihood of the loss: for a 1% chance they were 
willing to pay a maximum of $1; for a 99% chance they would pay up 
to $18. To avoid the shock, however, the maximum subjects would 
pay rose only from $7 (for a 1% chance of shock) to $10 (for a 99% 
chance).181 Whatever one might say about the subjects’ perceptions of 
those outcomes, it is clear that the impact of probability depended on 
the nature of the outcome. People seem to be willing to pay signifi-
cant amounts to avoid emotionally unpleasant outcomes, but the 
amount they will pay does not seem to vary much as the probability 
increases. Refining these findings in more recent research, Hsee and 
Rottenstreich show that in nonemotional states—that is, when peo-
ple focus on more rational calculation—people are relatively more 
sensitive to changes in probabilities or scope, consistent with ex-
pected utility theory.182 According to Hsee and Rottenstreich, under 
emotional states, probabilities also matter, but only at the extremes; 
that is, people are sensitive to the presence or absence of the possibil-
ity (that is, a change from 0% to some small percentage or, with less 
conclusive support, from a large percentage to certainty), but not at 
levels in between.183 Epstein’s findings, however, show that even such 
explicit attention to calculation does not always alleviate the short-
comings of experiential decisionmaking: recall the individuals who 
                                                                                                                    
 179. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 276-78; Sunstein, supra note 7, at 67. 
 180. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: 
On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (1999). 
 181. Id. 
 182. That is, focusing on more formulaic analysis of value, taking into account both the 
nature and the scope of a stimulus, rather than determining preference simply by evaluat-
ing one’s feelings toward that stimulus. See Christopher K. Hsee & Yuval Rottenstreich, 
Music, Pandas, and Muggers: On the Affective Psychology of Value, 133 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: GEN. 23, 23-24 (2004). 
 183. Id. at 28. 
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insisted that they had a “better” chance of a favorable decision out-
come when their chances of success were 7 out of 100 than 1 out of 
10.184 
 Professor Sunstein illustrates legal and policy implications of this 
bias, suggesting that “the demand for legal intervention can be 
greatly affected by probability neglect, so that government may end 
up engaging in extensive regulation precisely because intense emo-
tional reactions are making people relatively insensitive to the (low) 
probability that the relevant dangers will ever come to fruition.”185 In 
areas of administrative law, jury decisionmaking, regulatory legisla-
tion, and others, he notes the difficulties and implications involved in 
developing third-party interventions, ultimately recommending “in-
formation and education,” along with cost-benefit analysis of pro-
posed interventions if stronger measures become necessary.186 As I 
discuss below, however, “information and education” are not always 
effective remedies for bias.187 
  (b)   Biases Involving Immediate or Incidental Emotions 
 The biases above involve judgments about emotionally-laden 
events or tasks. But emotion and mood also directly influence ordi-
nary decisionmaking when decisions or judgments are made while in 
an emotional state. This is especially so when the affective state is 
triggered by a stimulus unrelated to the target of the task at hand. 
 i)   Affect Infusion 
 A substantial body of empirical research shows that both decisions 
and decisionmaking processes can be influenced by emotions at the 
time of judgment or decision.188 In some cases the emotion will be 
elicited by the decision at hand or circumstances surrounding it—for 
instance, juries swayed by compassion elicited by victim impact 
statements or by disgust induced by gruesome photographs placed 
into evidence.189 In other instances—equally, if not more interest-
                                                                                                                    
 184. Denes-Raj & Epstein, supra note 114, at 821-22. 
 185. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 68. 
 186. Id. at 106-07. 
 187. See infra Part IV.B. 
 188. See Shelly Chaiken, The Heuristic Model of Persuasion, in SOCIAL INFLUENCE: 
THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM, VOLUME 5, 3 (Mark P. Zanna et al. eds., 1987) (identifying ef-
fects of incidental mood on persuasion); Schwarz, supra note 145, at 433-34 (collecting 
studies); see also supra note 5 (listing sources).  
 189. For studies examining the impact of gruesome photographs see, for example, 
David A. Bright & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, 
Blame, and Jury Decision-making, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (2006) (showing impact of 
gruesome photographs on mock jurors’ emotional responses and on verdicts); Kevin S. 
Douglas et al., The Impact of Graphic Photographic Evidence on Mock Jurors’ Decisions in 
a Murder Trial: Probative or Prejudicial?, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 485, 499-500 (1997) 
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ing—the emotion (or mood) will be incidental to the decision but nev-
ertheless influences it.190 
 These effects manifest in a number of ways. Mood-congruent 
memories are more easily retrieved than memories incongruent with 
one’s current emotional state.191 Mood-congruent judgments are often 
made via a “how-do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic, with individuals in 
positive moods evaluating a target more favorably than those in 
negative moods.192 Mood can affect perceptions of mood-congruent 
probabilities, with people in positive moods predicting a higher like-
lihood of positive events or outcomes than of negative ones.193 And 
one of the most robust findings in the emotions literature is the effect 
mood has on processing strategy—in particular, how deeply a person 
processes information. Broadly speaking, individuals in positive 
moods tend to process information more superficially or heuristically, 
tend to rely more on stereotypes, and are more easily persuaded than 
individuals in negative moods.194 These mood effects—also called “af-
fect infusion,” as the decisionmaking process becomes “infused” with 
the unrelated mood being experienced195—can depend on the sort of 
judgment being made. Briefly (and perhaps counterintuitively), when 
a judgment is more constructive, entailing more effort and process-
ing, affect infusion is more likely (probably because there is more 
processing going on for mood to become involved in).196 In contrast, 
                                                                                                                    
(finding that photographs influenced verdicts even though mock jurors thought they 
should not and did not). For victim impact research see, for example, Edith Greene, The 
Many Guises of Victim Impact Evidence and Effects on Jurors’ Judgments, 5 PSYCHOL., 
CRIME & L. 331 (1999); James Luginbuhl & Michael Burkhead, Victim Impact Evidence in 
a Capital Trial: Encouraging Votes for Death, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 (1995); Bryan Myers 
et al., Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgments: The Effects of Harm Information 
and Witness Demeanor, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2393 (2002); see generally Jean M. 
Callihan, Victim Impact Statements in Capital Trials: A Selected Bibliography, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 569, 573-74 (2003) (listing studies). 
 190. See generally supra note 5 (listing sources). 
 191. E.g., Henry C. Ellis & Brent A. Moore, Mood and Memory, in HANDBOOK OF 
COGNITION AND EMOTION 193 (Tim Dalgleish & Mick J. Power eds., 1999); Klaus Fiedler et 
al., Is Mood Congruency an Effect of Genuine Memory or Response Bias?, 37 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 201 (2001). 
 192. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 5; Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, How Do I 
Feel About It? The Informative Function of Affective States, in AFFECT, COGNITION AND 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: NEW EVIDENCE AND INTEGRATIVE ATTEMPTS 44 (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph 
Forgas eds., 1988). 
 193. See, e.g., Thomas E. Nygren et al., The Influence of Positive Affect on the Decision 
Rule in Risk Situations: Focus on Outcome (and Especially Avoidance of Loss) Rather Than 
Probability, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 59 (1996). 
 194. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Note, though, that consistent with the 
distinction made above, such results can differ depending on which negative mood is in-
duced. See, e.g., Schwarz, supra note 145, at 434; Tiedens & Linton, supra note 149, at 973-
74. 
 195. See Joseph P. Forgas, Affective Influences on Attitudes and Judgments, in 
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES, supra note 4, at 596, 612. 
 196. Id. at 612-13. 
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when a judgment involves the simple retrieval of existing, especially 
“crystallized” knowledge or attitudes (a simpler process), then affect 
infusion is less likely.197 Understanding that a potential emotional 
bias may depend on the decision task at hand helps determine 
whether and when corrective intervention may be relevant.198 
 Judgments and decisionmaking may be influenced by incidental 
mood, but examples also abound of mood influencing behaviors rele-
vant to paternalism—both self- and other-related. For instance, 
women dieters (“restrained eaters”) who watched film clips inducing 
both positive and negative emotions tended to eat more while watch-
ing the clips, demonstrating that such emotional arousal somehow 
disinhibited women’s food-related restraint.199 Positive mood unre-
lated to the substance of negotiations can lead to more cooperative 
strategies and, by some criteria, more successful negotiations.200 
Negative mood usually (but not necessarily) leads to less helping be-
havior than positive mood.201 Relatedly, decisionmakers charged with 
distributive welfare tasks can be subject to mood effects; induced 
empathy can lead to increased and objectively unfair shares of allo-
cated goods.202 And directly relevant to employment and other sorts 
of discrimination, individuals in a positive mood are more likely to 
use stereotypes in judging others.203 Some interventions might be 
                                                                                                                    
 197. Id. at 612. 
 198. Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4, at 14-17 (documenting the 
impact of immediate, incidental mood on moral judgments). There I suggest that at first 
blush, such findings may indicate strong paternalistic policies such as requiring voters to 
watch a particular mood-inducing movie before voting (or, analogously, require jurors to 
watch some such video before their verdict), in order to avoid superficial decisionmaking. 
Id. at 23. I note, however, that the fact that voting often consists of simply acting on estab-
lished, crystallized judgments meets this proposal. Id. at 23-24; Blumenthal, supra note 2, 
at 50-51. 
 199. E.g., Joseph Cools et al., Emotional Arousal and Overeating in Restrained Eaters, 
101 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 348 (1992) (documenting that both positive and negative emo-
tional arousal triggered overeating in restrained eaters); David E. Schotte et al., Film-
Induced Negative Affect Triggers Overeating in Restrained Eaters, 99 J. ABNORMAL 
PSYCHOL. 317  (1990) (discussing how negative emotional arousal triggered overeating in 
restrained eaters); cf. Laurette Dubé et al., Affect Asymmetry and Comfort Food Consump-
tion, 86 PHYSIOLOGY & BEHAV. 559, 560 (2005) (documenting that positive emotional states 
lead to comfort food consumption for men and negative emotional states lead to comfort 
food consumption for women). 
 200. Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Nego-
tiator Cognition and Bargaining Strategies, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 565, 566-
67 (1998). Note that this is different from more common examples of emotion that stem 
from the bargaining itself having an influence on the process and substance of negotia-
tions. 
 201. See Blumenthal, Mood and Moral Judgment, supra note 4, at 4-5 nn.21-22 (citing 
studies). 
 202. E.g., C. Daniel Batson et al., Immorality from Empathy-Induced Altruism: When 
Compassion and Justice Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1042, 1042 (1995). 
 203. Andrea Abele et al., Positive Mood and In-Group—Out-Group Differentiation in a 
Minimal Group Setting, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1343, 1343 (1998); Her-
bert Bless et al., Mood and the Impact of Category Membership and Individuating Infor-
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geared toward ameliorating such mood effects; these might simply 
involve drawing attention to the relevant mood. That is, research 
shows that incidental mood can affect judgments through the “how-
do-I-feel-about-it” heuristic, where an existing mood is used as a 
proxy for one’s feelings toward or judgments about a target.204 When 
an individual is made aware of that incidental mood, its relevance as 
a proxy is removed and, at least in theory, the individual can then 
make unbiased judgments.205 In practice, however, as discussed more 
fully in Part IV, such corrections are not always effective and, as 
with many debiasing efforts, can in fact be counterproductive, due to 
overcorrection, rebound effects, or other concerns. 
 Other interventions might take advantage of the bias—for in-
stance, by encouraging or even mandating people to engage in men-
tal or physical activities that elevate mood (such as meditation or 
physical exercise) in order to reap the welfare benefits of being in a 
positive mood.206 Scholars and policymakers are beginning to discuss 
this sort of “positive paternalism.”207 
 ii)   Risk Perception 
 As alluded to earlier, immediately experienced emotions—positive 
or negative—can bias people’s perceptions of risk, including judg-
ments of the likelihood of risky events. The absence of emotional ex-
perience can do so as well. Mid-twentieth century neurosurgeons, for 
                                                                                                                    
mation, 26 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 935, 936 (1996); Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Happiness 
and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 621 
(1994). Even this can depend on the specific emotion; some negative emotions (such as an-
ger or anxiety) in fact increase the use of stereotypes, while others (such as sadness) de-
crease it. See Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Negative Affect and Social Judgment: The Dif-
ferential Impact of Anger and Sadness, 24 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 45 (1994); Dacher Kelt-
ner et al., Beyond Simple Pessimism: Effects of Sadness and Anger on Social Perception, 64 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 740 (1993); Rajagopal Raghunathan & Michel Tuan 
Pham, All Negative Moods Are Not Equal: Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness 
on Decision Making, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 56 (1999). 
 204. See, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 205. See, e.g., Schwarz & Clore, supra note 147. 
 206. I thank Chris Guthrie for pointing out this possibility, though I do not know 
whether he would endorse it. A potential difficulty, however, as sketched further below, is 
the loss of judgmental benefits of being in a negative mood: recall that some such moods 
can in fact improve some judgment accuracy, reduce the use of stereotypes, etc. See supra 
note 194 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Huang & Blumenthal, Positive Law and Policy, supra note 32; Huang & Blu-
menthal, Positive Policy/Positive Institutions, supra note 32; Kathryn Abrams & Hila 
Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CAL. L. REV. 319 (2007). At least one expert in 
emotion research has noted, though not in a paternalism context, the potential usefulness 
of “field experiments [testing] the psychological, social, and physical outcomes of interven-
tions aimed at cultivating positive emotions in daily life.” Barbara L. Fredrickson, Positive 
Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 120, 131 (C.R. Snyder & Shane J. Lopez 
eds., 2002).  Some such research exists.  See generally Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Positive 
Psychology Progress: Empirical Validation of Interventions, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 410 
(2005) (reviewing recent developments in the field of positive psychology). 
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instance, found that patients who underwent frontal lobotomies—an 
operation removing much of the areas apparently necessary for imag-
ining the emotional effect of future outcomes—seemed to be more 
impulsive than others and more prone to risk taking.208 More re-
cently, Damasio and colleagues have identified patients suffering 
from damage to high-level cortical areas involving emotion who, 
though understanding the probabilities involved in gambling games 
presented to them, nevertheless tended to make risky decisions and 
go bankrupt more often than nondamaged patients.209 
 When emotions are present, whether related or unrelated to the 
judgment at hand, the dynamics of actual affective influence are 
somewhat complex. Initial research on unrelated affect showed a 
tendency for mood-congruent judgments; individuals induced to feel 
negative affect made more pessimistic estimates about frequencies of 
death, for instance, than those placed in a positive mood. That re-
search also showed that people in positive moods tended to be more 
optimistic, overestimating the likelihood of positive events and un-
derestimating that of negative events.210 On the other hand, those 
same happy people tended to be more cautious or conservative than 
others in actual gambling or other risk-based behavior, especially 
when there was a risk of large or even moderate loss.211 Further re-
search in this line showed that negative moods can also lead to bi-
ased perceptions of risk.212 But negative moods can do so in a variety 
of ways. For instance, fear can lead to pessimistic risk estimates and 
risk-averse choices, while anger can lead to more optimistic esti-
mates and risk-seeking choices.213 
                                                                                                                    
 208. WALTER FREEMAN & JAMES W. WATTS, PSYCHOSURGERY: INTELLIGENCE, EMOTION 
AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING PREFRONTAL LOBOTOMY FOR MENTAL DISORDERS 303 
(1942). 
 209. See, e.g., Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the Ad-
vantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293 (1997). 
 210. See Eric J. Johnson & Amos Tversky, Affect, Generalization, and the Perception of 
Risk, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20 (1983); John D. Mayer et al., Mood-
Congruent Judgment is a General Effect, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 119 (1992). 
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McGregor, The Major Determinants of the Prediction of Social Events, 33 J. ABNORMAL & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 179 (1938). 
 211. See Hal R. Arkes et al., The Role of Potential Loss in the Influence of Affect on 
Risk-Taking Behavior, 42 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 181 
(1988); Alice M. Isen et al., Influence of Positive Affect on the Subjective Utility of Gains 
and Losses: It Is Just Not Worth the Risk, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 710 (1988); 
Alice M. Isen & Robert Patrick, The Effect of Positive Feeling on Risk-Taking: When the 
Chips are Down, 31 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 194 (1983). 
 212. See, e.g., Johnson & Tversky, supra note 210; William F. Wright & Gordon H. 
Bower; Mood Effects on Subjective Probability Assessment, 52 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 276 (1992). 
 213. Lerner & Keltner, supra note 149, at 480-87. 
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 As Professor Sunstein suggests, when emotions are related to the 
risk judgment at hand, the emotion-inducing “vivid images and con-
crete pictures of disaster can ‘crowd out’ other kinds of thoughts, in-
cluding the crucial thought that the probability of disaster is very 
small.”214 All of these emotionally driven misperceptions of risk may 
warrant intervention in order to key legislative action to the actual, 
not the perceived, risk.215 And in the context of emotional judgments, 
there is some empirical justification for such intervention: specifi-
cally, predictions of others’ risk preferences—in which we ordinarily 
see others as more risk-seeking—are actually more accurate when 
the target of prediction is vivid.216 
 Much previous discussion on public perception (and mispercep-
tion) of risk has focused on cognitive biases such as the availability 
bias.217 However, the possibility that emotion has a stronger effect 
than cognition on perceptions of risk may lead to different ap-
proaches to policy intervention. The literature has also constrained 
itself to broad, valence-based framing of emotion, without differenti-
ating among similarly valenced emotions. Making such distinctions 
can help identify appropriate interventions. 
 iii)   Hot/Cold Empathy Gaps 
 Related to the affective forecasting literature,218 substantial re-
search has identified “hot/cold empathy gaps,” that is, the (fairly in-
tuitive) tendency for people in an emotional state to make inaccurate 
predictions about how they would behave when in a nonemotional 
state (and vice versa). In a classic study, for instance, women who 
one month before giving birth strongly disapproved of the use of an-
esthesia during delivery—and who repeated such preferences even 
during early labor—nevertheless changed those attitudes during ac-
                                                                                                                    
 214. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 82. 
 215. Amitai Aviram discusses an important related aspect of such intervention, the 
“placebo effect” of legislation. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in 
Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54 (2006). There, the issue is legislative 
action that is paternalistic in the sense of changing public perception about, for instance, 
the risk of disaster, even though the legislation might be primarily or even wholly symbolic 
(that is, the legislation may not affect the actual risk). Id. His discussion is largely framed 
in cognitive terms. 
 216. Christopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, A Fundamental Prediction Error: Self-
Others Discrepancies in Risk Preference, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 45 (1997). 
Vividness here meant that the predictor could see the target about whose risk preferences 
predictions were being made, even when the predictor did not know or interact with the 
target. Id.  
 217. See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regu-
lation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
 218. See supra Part III.C.2.a.i. 
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tive labor and requested anesthesia.219 In other research, male study 
subjects who were sexually aroused predicted behaving in a more 
sexually aggressive way in dating scenarios and reported a higher 
likelihood of engaging in unsafe sex than nonaroused subjects.220 
Without providing proof of behavior, these latter findings are consis-
tent with the idea that nonaroused (“cold”) subjects inaccurately 
imagine how they might behave when aroused.221 Similarly, these 
empathy gaps have also been found to be relevant to the likelihood of 
certain sexual behavior, including the probability that teenagers222 or 
gay men223 would use contraceptives in sexual situations. As another 
example, drug addicts who abstain from drugs for a period of time 
may overestimate their resistance to relapse. Even a small amount of 
drug use can easily lead to even more craving and to relapse.224 A 
number of creative and interesting suggestions have been made re-
cently to address such emotionally-based, time-inconsistent prefer-
ences, including smoking licenses,225 suicide “notification” prac-
tices,226 or various forms of “cooling off.”227 
 Each such suggestion, of course, involves some level of paternal-
ism, though many of these authors are at pains to minimize the pa-
ternalistic nature of the intervention. One set of commentators more 
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Underlying Sexual Risk-Taking, in THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION: ITS APPLICATION TO 
AIDS PREVENTIVE BEHAVIOR 227 (Deborah J. Terry et al. eds., 1993). 
 224. Eliot L. Gardner & Joyce H. Lowinson, Drug Craving and Positive/Negative He-
donic Brain Substrates Activated by Addicting Drugs, 5 SEMINARS IN THE NEUROSCIENCES 
359 (1993). 
 225. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1483 (2005) 
(discussing smoking license proposal by Jay Bhattacharya and Darius Lakdawalla); cf. 
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q. 
J. ECON. 1261 (2001) (developing optimal “sin tax” for smoking); Ted O’Donoghue & Mat-
thew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. 186 (2003) (discussing paternalistic policies in context of smoking). 
 226. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1245 (noting the possibility of requiring a suicidal 
person to give one month’s notice of his intent). 
 227. Id. at 1245. Examples might be waiting periods before marriage or divorce. See 
Kronman, supra note 18, at 796 (arguing for longer waiting periods before allowing di-
vorce, in order to increase nonemotional decisionmaking); Scott, supra note 124, at 48 
(suggesting that waiting periods would increase the likelihood of reconciliation). See infra 
Part IV.B.3. (discussing cooling-off periods). 
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open about the paternalistic nature of their suggestion are Professors 
Ayres and Baker, who recently called for establishing a new crime of 
“reckless sexual conduct”228: 
Appreciating that men and women may underestimate the true 
risks of unprotected first-time sexual encounters strengthens the 
rationales for government intervention. Thus, our crime can be 
justified now not only by the traditional “externalities” argu-
ment—men and women don’t take into account the harms to other 
people when they engage in reckless sex—but also as a form of 
cognitive “paternalism” aimed at increasing the perceived risk of 
engaging in unprotected first-time sexual encounters.229 
Similar to Professors Sunstein and Scott, however,230 they frame 
their reasoning in cognitive, rather than emotional terms. 
  (c)   Manipulation by Others 
 Private parties—firms, marketers, individuals—as well as gov-
ernmental actors may seek to capitalize on any of the above natu-
rally occurring emotional biases in order to further an agenda of 
moneymaking or power.231 An important difference between the 
negative consequences resulting from naturally occurring biases and 
those from biases taken advantage of by others, private or public, 
may be the public’s receptivity to the paternalistic policy that might 
be proposed as a result. Voters are likely more receptive to policies 
designed to protect themselves from manipulated decisions than to 
policies perceived as more directly infringing on their own autono-
mous decisionmaking.232 
                                                                                                                    
 228. Ian Ayres & Katharine K. Baker, A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex, 72 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 599, 649-50 (2005). A person would be guilty of such crime if, in a first-time encounter 
with another person, he or she had sexual intercourse without using a condom. Although 
Ayres and Baker use gender neutral language in the definition, they suggest that the 
likely disparate effect on men is justified, id. at 644-46, partly on paternalistic grounds, id. 
at 646. 
 229. Id. at 649. 
 230. See supra note 86 (commenting on Sunstein’s cognitivism); supra note 124 (com-
menting on Scott’s cognitivism). 
 231. See Glaeser, supra note 9, at 155-56. 
 232. Compare Shapiro, supra note 16, at 530 (noting public reaction in Massachusetts 
to mandatory seat belt laws—unwillingness to accept the proposed intervention “as a mat-
ter of principle”—due to perceived paternalistic nature of the law), with Michelle M. Mello 
et al., The McLawsuit: The Fast-Food Industry and Legal Accountability for Obesity, 22 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 207, 214 (2003) (“A recent public opinion poll suggests that Americans 
are divided in their views about the role of government in combating obesity: 48 percent 
feel that obesity is ‘a private issue that people need to deal with on their own,’ while 47 
percent feel that it is ‘a public health issue that society needs to help solve.’ ” (footnote 
omitted)). Professor Glaeser documents the decrease in smoking from 1964 to 2004, in part 
due to soft paternalistic action by the government. Glaeser, supra note 9, at 153-54. He 
also notes that “beliefs about the harmfulness of cigarettes have changed over time,” id. at 
154, as have perceptions of cigarette companies’ manipulation, fraud, and deception, Mello 
et al., supra, at 211-12. Together, such changing perceptions have led to acceptance of 
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 i)   Securities Litigation 
 One commentator has recently suggested protecting investors by 
revising the defenses afforded to those involved in securities litiga-
tion, in particular the defense of “puffery” and the “total mix” and 
“bespeaks caution” doctrines, to better reflect investors’ actual deci-
sionmaking.233 Specifically, Professor Huang suggests that courts 
consider not only the cognitive impact that prospectuses or other in-
formational material might have on potential investors and on 
shareholders, but also the emotional impact.234 He notes that the 
positive mood induced by “puffery” can lead to more superficial proc-
essing of a prospectus containing such puffery235 and recommends 
that that mood be considered when evaluating how a “reasonable” 
reader might interpret that material.236 Similarly, he suggests modi-
fying the current “total mix” doctrine of evaluating the materiality of 
information presented in investment material to include evaluation 
of the total affect induced by that information.237 Taking such steps to 
protect investors against their own emotional tendencies is one ex-
ample of emotion data leading to paternalistic steps. 
 ii)   Decisionmaking About Abortion 
 Another instance of the potential for manipulation by others in-
volves the influence of emotion on a woman’s decisionmaking about 
abortion. Because an abortion decision is so personal, often religious, 
and (as a broad public issue) receives such publicity, it is of course a 
highly emotional issue. But two other aspects of the decision, closely 
related to each other, involve emotional influence that might lead to 
paternalistic steps—albeit in different directions. 
 First, some research, though controversial, suggests that a small 
percentage of women who elect an abortion later experience regret 
and consequent poor mental health.238 Moreover, some groups of 
women are more susceptible to such negative sequelae than others: 
those who pursue abortion for reasons of birth defects in the fetus;239 
                                                                                                                    
harder legislative paternalism and increased liability for such companies. See Glaeser, su-
pra note 9, at 154; see also, Mello et al., supra, at 212. 
 233. Huang, supra note 149, at 111-22.  
 234. Id. at 115. 
 235. See id. at 118. 
 236. See id. at 121. 
 237. See id. at 122. 
 238. See Nancy E. Adler et al., Psychological Factors in Abortion: A Review, 47 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1194, 1198-1200 (1992) (discussing the relatively benign effects that abor-
tion-electing women generally face, but also discussing factors that can lead to negative ef-
fects).  
 239. J. R. Ashton, The Psychosocial Outcome of Induced Abortion, 87 BRIT. J. 
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1115 (1980); Bruce D. Blumberg et al., Psychological Seque-
lae of Abortions Performed for a Genetic Indication, 122 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 
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younger women, as well as unmarried women without children;240 
women who lack social support;241 and women who had previously 
suffered some sort of emotional disturbance or psychological dysfunc-
tion.242 In some instances, these populations are in fact the ones more 
likely to pursue abortions.243 Thus, although it is clear that most 
women experience predominantly positive emotional responses after 
abortion,244 a bias based on affective forecasting may afford the state 
a justification for providing information about such negative seque-
lae. That is, although individuals are usually correct about the va-
lence of future emotional reactions, predictions of intensity and dura-
tion are usually inaccurate.245 Assume a state does want to discour-
age women from having abortions. Relying on the affective forecast-
ing literature, the state might seek to document a tendency for 
women to underestimate the negative reaction they would have to 
having chosen an abortion and, accordingly, argue that it is proper to 
intervene to protect a woman who might be unduly optimistic. Thus, 
state legislative paternalism might be involved here in trying to en-
sure that a woman has all the information necessary to make an in-
formed decision—that is, protecting her from an emotional, puta-
tively ill-informed decision. As much information as possible should 
be given, the argument runs, to inform the woman of future potential 
consequences, including future emotional consequences, to her.246 
                                                                                                                    
799 (1975); C.M. Friedman et al., The Decision-making Process and the Outcome of Thera-
peutic Abortion, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1332 (1974). 
 240. Adler et al., supra note 238, at 1200. (“Younger and unmarried women without 
children are relatively more likely than those who are older and who have already given 
birth to experience negative responses.”). 
 241. See id. at 1201 (reviewing studies, but also suggesting that the link between social 
support and postabortion emotions may be less clear than thought); see also Jeanette Mar-
tucci, Meta-Analysis: Psychsocial Predictors of Psychological Sequelae of Induced Abortion 
57 (1998) (discussing the lack of perceived social support associated with poorer psycho-
logical adjustment) (unpublished dissertation, Miami Institute of Psychology of the Carib-
bean Center for the Advanced Studies) (on file with author). 
 242. Nancy Felipe Russo, Psychological Aspects of Unwanted Pregnancy and Its Resolu-
tion, in ABORTION, MEDICINE, AND THE LAW 593, 615 (J. Douglas Butler & David F. Wal-
bert eds., 4th. ed. 1992) (noting that “history of emotional disturbance” is a “risk facto[r] 
for negative emotional responses after abortion”). 
 243. See, e.g., Adler et al., supra note 238, at 1196 (noting that far more unmarried 
women are abortion patients than married women, and that abortion patients tend to be 
younger, most commonly 20-24 years old); see also PHYSICIANS FOR REPROD. CHOICE AND 
HEALTH & THE GUTTMACHER INST., AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES 24-
25 (2006), http://www.guttmacher.org/presentations/abort_slides.pdf (showing that women 
age 20-24 have the highest abortion rates, and that approximately 67% were never mar-
ried). 
 244. Adler et al., supra note 238, at 1198, 1202; see also Martucci, supra note 241, at 
58-59 (reporting lower depression and anxiety in women who had abortions relative to con-
trol groups). 
 245. Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 166-67. 
 246. See, e.g., Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decision-
making Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 813-15 (1996) (providing argument of hy-
pothetical State Attorney General as to justifications for mandating such information). 
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 And such an approach is constitutional under existing doctrine. 
Under Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a 
statute requiring informed consent does not qualify as an “undue 
burden” on a woman seeking an abortion if the information is “truth-
ful and not misleading.”247 This approach reshaped abortion jurispru-
dence, allowing states opposed to abortion to mandate various in-
formed consent procedures under the guise of championing a 
woman’s decisionmaking autonomy.248 
 But this leads to the second paternalism point, focusing on judi-
cial rather than legislative paternalism: although the information 
provided by the state under the guise of providing full and complete 
information may be truthful, it may nevertheless still be misleading 
under an approach similar to Professor Huang’s.249 Specifically, indi-
viduals hearing emotionally-laden communications eliciting fear or 
anxiety may be more susceptible to persuasion by that message.250 
 State-provided information that focuses on explicit descriptions of 
a developing fetus and/or the abortion procedure, or mandatory pho-
tographs or videos, may thus induce anxiety or fear to such a point 
that decisionmaking is affected and a woman might come to a deci-
sion different from that which she might under a less emotional 
judgment process. In such an instance, judicial intervention might be 
appropriate in evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, whether the in-
formation provided may have burdened the woman’s decisionmaking 
to such an extent as to render it unconstitutional.251 
 iii)   Susceptibility to Advertising 
 There is little question that marketers are aware of, and make use 
of, emotional influences on consumer behavior.252 From pleasant 
                                                                                                                    
 247. 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
 248. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22; see also Sten-
berg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 961 (2000).  
 249. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22. 
 250. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 86, at 771 (“when people are anxious and fearful, 
they are less likely to engage in systematic processing” and thus may be more easily per-
suaded); Sunstein, supra note 103, at 1565 (discussing the same); see also Richard E. Petty 
et al., Multiple Roles for Affect in Persuasion, in EMOTION AND SOCIAL JUDGMENTS, supra 
note 5, at 181, 183 (“[T]he most notable instances in which negative moods have produced 
more favorable attitudes reside in the vast literature on fear appeals.”); Kim Witte, Putting 
the Fear Back into Fear Appeals: The Extended Parallel Process Model, 59 COMM. 
MONOGRAPHS 329 (1992). 
 251. This argument, including a critique of the former suggestion, is developed more 
fully in Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22; cf. Glaeser, supra 
note 9, at 135 (stating that “[g]overnments have a strong incentive to abuse any persua-
sion-related infrastructure”). 
 252. A full discussion of such machinations would move far beyond this paper’s scope. 
For analysis, see, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seri-
ously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 732-33 (1999) [herein-
after Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation] (noting use by marketers of 
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aromas to sexy models to manipulative music, marketers seek to in-
duce particular affective states in consumers.  Their goal is to take 
advantage of individuals’ tendencies to process more superficially 
and engage in “splurchases” (spontaneous purchases) when in a posi-
tive mood,253 and to avoid such spontaneity and process more deeply 
when in a negative mood.254 Similarly, marketers seek to capitalize 
on risk- or thrill-seeking consumers’ emotional reactions to fast cars 
and dangerous or “extreme” sports,255 as well as naturally-occurring 
or marketer-created fears of physical or financial consequences.256 
 Those seeking to address such manipulation have suggested both 
prospective and retrospective efforts. Hanson and Kysar, for in-
stance, developed an extensive discussion of liability regimes that 
might be imposed on market manipulators.257 Moreover, substantial 
efforts have been made in a variety of contexts to educate consumers 
about the effects of marketing ploys and both positive and negative 
emotional appeals. As discussed more fully below, however, such 
                                                                                                                    
positive affect to influence and manipulate consumers’ perceptions); Hanson & Kysar, su-
pra note 140 passim; Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, supra note 9, at 228 (suggesting that 
“spammers generally make offers that deliberately take advantage of people’s weaknesses 
and fears”); Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking and Marketing: Introduction to the 
Special Issue, 17 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 277, 279 (2000) (“The manipulation of consumer 
emotions by marketers has long been a staple of successful advertising.”); Eva Walther & 
Sofia Grigoriadis, Why Sad People Like Shoes Better: The Influence of Mood on the Evalua-
tive Conditioning of Consumer Attitudes, 21 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 755 passim (2004); 
Scot Silverglate, Comment, Subliminal Perception and the First Amendment: Yelling Fire 
in a Crowded Mind?, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1243, 1262 (1990) (“Clever advertising execu-
tives appeal to a consumer’s emotional or psychological needs . . . .”); Note, Making Sense of 
Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2836, 2848 (2005) (“The external design of products often acts seductively on a con-
sumer by tugging at his emotions (and with any luck, his wallet).”). 
 253. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140, at 1444-46; Sarah C. Haan, Note, The “Per-
suasion Route” of the Law: Advertising and Legal Persuasion, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 
1299-1300 (2000) (noting impact of positive affect and its relation to superficial processing). 
 254. See, e.g., Sharon E. Beatty & M. Elizabeth Ferrell, Impulse Buying: Modeling its 
Precursors, 74 J. RETAILING 169  (1998) (noting that a negative mood seems to alleviate the 
tendency to act on purchasing urges); Kordelia Spies et al., Store Atmosphere, Mood and 
Purchasing Behavior, 14 INT’L J. RES. IN MARKETING 1, 11 tbl.7 (1997) (showing that shop-
pers experiencing a negative mood change spent less on spontaneous purchases than those 
in positive mood); Patrick Van Kenhove & Patrick Desrumaux, The Relationship Between 
Emotional States and Approach or Avoidance Responses in a Retail Environment, 7 INT’L 
REV. RETAIL, DISTRIBUTION & CONSUMER RES. 351, 362-63 (1997) (consumers in negative 
mood engaged in more avoidance than those in positive mood). 
 255. See, e.g., Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140, at 1461-62. 
 256. See, e.g., id. at 1462-66 (giving examples of advertising campaigns either capitaliz-
ing on or explicitly manipulating consumers’ fears); cf. Rachlinski, Cognitive Errors, supra 
note 9, at 223 (“Advertising and marketing strategies that concern risky behavior (includ-
ing financial decisions) commonly are directed carefully at specific demographic seg-
ments.”). 
 257. See generally Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 
252; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to 
Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259 (2000); Hanson & Kysar, supra 
note 140. 
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educational efforts are typically unsuccessful, and at times can be 
counterproductive.258 
 iv)   Contract Terms 
 As sketched above, Professors Korobkin and Marrow have each 
discussed potential judicially paternalistic steps that might be taken 
in the context of manipulative, and thus arguably unconscionable, 
conduct in developing contract terms.259 Both reflect, to some extent, 
the discussion in Part III.C.2.c.ii., above, of state manipulation of the 
abortion decisionmaking process. Professor Korobkin’s discussion fo-
cused more on cognitive limitations of bounded rationality, indicating 
the possibility for potentially positive paternalistic policies.260 Profes-
sor Marrow’s discussion takes a similar approach, focusing more on 
emotional factors and reflecting Hanson and Kysar’s suggestions of 
imposing liability. 261 For instance, he highlights the manipulation in 
one-sided liquidated damages clauses in contracts for the provision of 
emergency services, emphasizing the “experiential” or affective and 
emotional influences that tend to “impede sound [rational] reason-
ing.”262 As a result of the potential for such manipulation, he encour-
ages courts to expand unconscionability doctrine by developing the 
tort of Consequential Procedural Unconscionability,263 which could 
include efforts by a seller or provider who takes deliberate advantage 
of known emotional biases to manipulate a potential buyer. 
 Although this tort has not taken hold doctrinally, courts som-
teimes do explicitly take into account the potential for emotional bi-
ases in evaluating the viability of contracts and contractual terms. 
That is, in some circumstances judges may be more willing to step in 
and overturn otherwise valid contracts. The clearest example in-
volves courts’ evaluation of contracts for a surrogate mother’s ser-
vices. Following the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in In re 
Baby M.,264 emphasis is often placed on whether a contract allows the 
surrogate mother to reverse her decision to relinquish the baby upon 
birth.265 Whether the contract acknowledges the possibility that a 
surrogate mother might change her mind based on the unpredicted 
                                                                                                                    
 258. See infra Part IV.B.; cf. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 140, at 1447 (“Of course, 
knowing of such [marketing] techniques does not necessarily render one immune to their 
effects.”). 
 259. See Korobkin, supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also Marrow, supra note 
43 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Korobkin, supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Marrow, supra note 43. 
 262. Id. at 49 n.68. 
 263. Id. at 38 (identifying the tort of Consequential Procedural Unconscionability and 
defining its elements). 
 264. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 265. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 209-14. 
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emotions involved with pregnancy and childbirth thus plays an im-
portant role in determining that contract’s enforceability.266 This is 
not to say that manipulation is necessarily involved, but it does re-
veal courts’ willingness to step in ex post to address a party’s 
changed preferences.267  
IV.   EVALUATING INTERVENTIONS 
A.   Questions 
 The previous Part identified a number of emotional biases dis-
cussed in the social science literature that might detrimentally affect 
individuals’ decisionmaking, and the potential need each bias raises 
for some sort of intervention to reduce or eliminate it. I turn now to 
empirical literature describing efforts to correct some of these biases, 
mentioning possible governmental interventions that might reflect 
such efforts. I discuss ways in which the biases above may play out in 
real-life, law- and policy-based contexts. 
 A crucial question, of course, is an intervention’s potential effec-
tiveness or success, especially in evaluating the costs involved.268 
Thus, as I have suggested throughout, we must determine whether 
any of these emotional biases can in fact be corrected; if so, can we 
quantify, or at least roughly assess, the difficulty or costs of doing so? 
Two discussions become important in this context. First, what sort of 
interventions might be appropriate? Based on previous research, 
there are a number of different possibilities of how to correct a 
bias,269 and I sketched some suggestions in the discussion above. Be-
low, I collate these into four categories: (1) self-correction by an indi-
vidual; (2) education about particular biases or the circumstances 
leading to susceptibility to them; (3) procedural interventions such as 
cooling-off periods; and (4) substantive interventions, in which a de-
cision is taken away from an individual either by substituting a third 
party’s decision for his own, or by taking the decision away from him 
in the first place. Ex post judicial paternalism, where a court acts 
                                                                                                                    
 266. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d at 1248 (“Under the contract, the natural mother is ir-
revocably committed before she knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never 
makes a totally voluntary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the 
baby’s birth is, in the most important sense, uninformed . . . .”). 
 267. Professor Hillman has pointed this out in another context as well. See Hillman, 
supra note 123. 
 268. BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 3, at 9-10 (“A very large question 
involves the extent to which education can counteract cognitive and motivational distor-
tions, so as to eliminate some of the effects described above. . . . Is it possible for those in-
volved in law to ‘debias’ people . . . ? What institutions work best at reducing the effects of 
biases?”); see, e.g., Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1219; Rachlinski, Uncertain Psychologi-
cal Case, supra note 9, at 1219. 
 269. Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1244-47 (outlining different types of paternalistic 
intervention); see also Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 9, at 1188-90. 
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retrospectively to relieve an individual of unanticipated conse-
quences of a particular decision or decisionmaking process, might 
also be seen as a substantive intervention, even though this sort of 
substantive decision substitution would be at the individual’s be-
hest.270 
 Second, it is important to compare the effectiveness of correcting 
cognitive biases with any data on the effectiveness of correcting emo-
tional biases. Again, to date most legal and empirical analysis has 
been in the context of cognitive biases, with little attention paid to 
emotional ones. Further, little attention has been paid to the effec-
tiveness of potential corrective techniques. Indeed, even scholars 
conducting empirical research on decisionmaking recognize the im-
portance of further research on correcting emotional biases.271 I ad-
dress such effectiveness below, discussing different attempts to rem-
edy both cognitive and affective biases, and address whether such bi-
ases might be differentially correctable. 
B.   Effectiveness of Debiasing 
 The first two potential means of debiasing are closely related, and 
involve somewhat less intrusive levels of intervention: self-correction 
and education. 
1.   Debiasing Through Self-Correction 
 First, we might have a deliberate effort by the actor to correct bi-
ases. At first glance, this may be thought to occur with decisionmak-
ing involving higher stakes than ordinary social judgments, either 
because the higher stakes prompt more careful decisionmaking or 
because those stakes increase the likelihood of recourse to other, 
more reliable sources.272 Unfortunately, however, neither appears to 
be the case. Financial incentives, for instance, are only unreliably 
successful in ameliorating biases,273 and it is unclear whether the 
                                                                                                                    
 270. See infra note 356. 
 271. Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND 
DECISION MAKING, supra note 4, at 316, 334 (“Identifying debiasing techniques for affect-
based biases is a promising new area.”). 
 272. See, e.g., Glaeser, supra note 9, at 140 (“Outside of the lab, people have access to 
advisers, books, the Internet, and more time. Their willingness to spend time and money to 
use these resources will surely depend on the stakes involved in the decision.”). 
 273. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incen-
tives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999) (finding mixed results of influence of incentives on judgment and 
decisionmaking tasks in 74 empirical studies); Ralph Hertwig et al., Judgments of Risk 
Frequencies: Tests of Possible Cognitive Mechanisms, 31 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: 
LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 621 (2005) (noting financial incentives’ failure to influ-
ence judgment accuracy); Larrick, supra note 271, at 321 (observing that there is “little 
empirical evidence [that] incentives consistently improve mean decision performance” (ci-
tation omitted)). But see Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Trans-
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judgment involved in recognizing when to seek recourse is not also 
influenced by bounded rationality and other cognitive and, perhaps, 
emotional limitations.274 
 Further, in order for self-correction to have a chance to succeed, 
the individual must be aware of the bias and must be motivated to 
correct it.275 There is some evidence that when awareness and moti-
vation are both present, cognitive biases can be attenuated.276 But 
people typically assume that they are unbiased.277 Moreover, it is un-
clear whether this awareness-and-motivation mechanism is success-
ful for emotional biases.278 For instance, self-control problems that 
lead to procrastination may not be overcome even by motivated indi-
viduals who recognize their difficulty. People do realize that they im-
pulsively procrastinate, and even self-impose costly deadlines to try 
to overcome such tendencies. 279 Nevertheless, they are unlikely to set 
those deadlines effectively and optimally; outsiders can set deadlines 
that are more effective.280 Other research shows that individuals who 
were intrinsically motivated to make accurate evaluations of a target 
person tried to compensate for irrelevant affective influence on their 
judgment, but in fact tended to overcompensate.281 Additional studies 
                                                                                                                    
form Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225 (1994) (suggesting that 
individuals act more rationally with increasing incentives, though biases are not always 
eliminated). 
 274. Cf. Sunstein & Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 59 (because of bounded rationality, 
“people may choose second-order strategies that badly disserve their own goals, even when 
the stakes are high” (citation omitted)). 
 275. Wegner & Bargh, supra note 117, at 472 (“[I]f the person is not aware that [some-
thing] is influencing his or her judgment, no control is possible.” (citation omitted)); id. at 
484 (“motivational impetus” is necessary to control biased decisionmaking). 
 276. Id.; see also Duane T. Wegener et al., Not All Stereotyping is Created Equal: Dif-
ferential Consequences of Thoughtful Versus Nonthoughtful Stereotyping, 90 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 42, 43 (2006) (“[U]se of stereotypes is decreased when moti-
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be held accountable for their ratings of targets.” (citation omitted)); Timothy D. Wilson et 
al., Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra 
note 3, at 185, 186-87 (noting elements necessary for correcting bias or “mental contamina-
tion,” including awareness of the bias and motivation and capacity to correct it). 
 277. Wilson et al., supra note 276, at 190 (“[P]eople’s default response is to assume that 
their judgments are uncontaminated.”). 
 278. See Cathy McFarland et al., Mood Acknowledgment and Correction for the Mood-
Congruency Bias in Social Judgment, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 483, 484 (2003) 
(noting that “there has been relatively little research examining the circumstances that 
prompt such mood correction”). 
 279. Dan Ariely & Klaus Wertenbroch, Procrastination, Deadlines, and Performance: 
Self-Control by Precommitment, 13 PSYCHOL. SCI. 219, 224 (2002) (demonstrating that 
“people strategically try to curb [procrastination] by using costly self-imposed deadlines, 
and that self-imposed deadlines are not always as effective as some external deadlines in 
boosting task performance”). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See, e.g., Leonard Berkowitz et al., On the Correction of Feeling-Induced Judg-
mental Biases, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL JUDGMENTS, su-
pra note 5, at 131; Linda M. Isbell & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Correcting for Mood-Induced Bias 
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demonstrate this risk of overcorrection—a risk discussed more fully 
below—showing that although some motivated attention to one’s 
mood can decrease affective biases, it is also possible that individuals 
“ ‘go overboard’ in their correction efforts,”282 and make emotionally-
biased judgments in the other direction despite their awareness and 
motivation, and despite their increased efforts to think about the 
particular decision target.283 Finally, individual differences tend to 
play a role in whether attention to mood can decrease its biasing ef-
fects on judgment, sometimes in detrimental ways. Specifically, for 
individuals who naturally tend to monitor their mood states, moti-
vated processing can cause those in a good mood to make more accu-
rate judgments than unmotivated processing.284 However, recall that 
those in a negative mood tend to make less superficial judgments.285 
Motivated processing, therefore, might reduce the mood effects for 
such self-monitors. But because it was, in part, those effects that lead 
to increased accuracy, the reduction came at the cost of judgment ac-
curacy for those in a negative mood. 
 When motivated processing involves the active suppression of at-
titudes, cognitions, or emotions, there are other serious costs as well. 
Suppression of emotional responses, as well as similar efforts to self-
regulate, leads to what psychologist Roy Baumeister has called “ego-
depletion”—a decrease in postsuppression capacity to engage in simi-
lar self-control: “Acts of self-control, responsible decision making, and 
active choice seem to interfere with other such acts that follow soon 
after.”286 This decreased ability to self-regulate also follows efforts to 
suppress stereotype use.287 Essentially, what Baumeister and col-
                                                                                                                    
in the Evaluation of Political Candidates: The Roles of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 
25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 237 (1999). 
 282. McFarland et al., supra note 278, at 489 (citing David DeSteno et al., supra note 
149, and Victor C. Ottati & Linda M. Isbell, Effects of Mood During Exposure to Target In-
formation on Subsequently Reported Judgments: An On-Line Model of Misattribution and 
Correction, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 39 (1996)). 
 283. Wegener et al., supra note 276, at 50 (noting that effortful thought may not only 
lead to decreased use of stereotypes but may also create stereotypes more stable and resis-
tant to change). 
 284. Joseph P. Forgas et al., Mood Effects on Eyewitness Memory: Affective Influences 
on Susceptibility to Misinformation, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 574, 584 (2005) 
(demonstrating that explicit instructions to suppress affect worked only for individuals de-
scribed as high self monitors and socially desirable). 
 285. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 286. Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self A Limited Resource?, 74 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1263-64 (1998); see also Mark Muraven et al., Self-
Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 774 (1998); Mark Muraven & Roy F. Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion 
of Limited Resources: Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 247 
(2000). 
 287. Jennifer A. Richeson & J. Nicole Shelton, When Prejudice Does Not Pay: Effects of 
Interracial Contact on Executive Function, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 290 (2003); Jennifer A. 
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leagues document is the tendency for active self-regulation to have 
unintended consequences after that regulation ends. Although self-
regulation may be successful in reducing biased decisionmaking, ad-
ditional costs accrue that influence subsequent behavior and deci-
sions—as in the overcorrection example above, but in different deci-
sionmaking contexts. Depending on how serious that postregulation 
behavior or decisionmaking is, therefore, the costs of such self-control 
may outweigh its benefits. Accordingly (and unfortunately), these re-
searchers suggest, “these results point to a potentially serious con-
straint on the human capacity for control (including self-control) and 
deliberate decision making,”288 a constraint with important implica-
tions for paternalistic policies.289 
 A final concern for such motivated self-correction as a paternalis-
tic intervention is semantic: under our initial definition, it is simply 
difficult to conceptualize this phenomenon as paternalism. That is, 
intrinsically motivated self-correction does not really involve much 
actual third-party intrusion. When such self-correction is motivated 
by another individual or by other extrinsic motivation, it more closely 
approaches “paternalism” as such. From this perspective, it elides 
easily into the second category of intervention, educating or inform-
ing people of biases.290 
2.   Debiasing Through Education 
 Indeed, taking either an informed consumer or a classical rational 
decisionmaker perspective, providing information and education is 
often seen as an ameliorative measure for overcoming shortcomings 
or biases in decisionmaking.291 Simply providing an individual with 
accurate information—regardless of its emotional valence—is seen as 
facilitating autonomous decisionmaking, as in the abortion context 
discussed above.292 Similarly, providing disclosure about a product—
regardless of its emotional valence or of its likely effect on a recipi-
ent—is seen as a viable means of avoiding liability for the recipient’s 
                                                                                                                    
Richeson & Sophie Trawalter, Why Do Interracial Interactions Impair Executive Function? 
A Resource Depletion Account, 88 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 934, 944 (2005). 
 288. Baumeister et al., supra note 286, at 1264. 
 289. Individual differences may play a role in these effects. One recent study found 
that suppression does lead to ego depletion and does lead to increased subsequent stereo-
typing, but only for individuals less likely to use stereotypes in the first place.  Ernestine 
H. Gordijn et al., Consequences of Stereotype Suppression and Internal Suppression Moti-
vation: A Self-Regulation Approach, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 212 (2004). 
Thus, the good news of such research is the possibility that such ego depletion may not oc-
cur as a result of suppression—less promising is that that news only applies to those for 
whom correction would be less likely. 
 290. Cf. Frey et al., supra note 273, at 224 (suggesting that formal education assists 
individuals in recognizing decisionmaking biases). 
 291. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 292. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22. 
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choice about that product, as in the securities or credit card con-
text.293 
 Unfortunately, however, this approach is not much more effective 
than the last.294 In the cognitive context, for instance, one of the more 
difficult biases to correct is the hindsight bias. Simply informing an 
individual about the bias is usually unsuccessful;295 more aggressive 
tactics are often required in order to be successful.296 Other biases, 
such as the self-serving bias, can sometimes be corrected through 
identifying counterarguments and asking a decisionmaker to list 
weaknesses in his own position: “In the literature on debiasing, one 
type of intervention stands out as effective against a wide range of 
biases. This involves having subjects question their own judgment by 
explicitly considering counterarguments to their own thinking.”297 
                                                                                                                    
 293. See Camerer et al., supra note 9, at 1236-37 (discussing similar legislation in the 
context of pensions, responding to the Enron failure: “a bill designed to induce 401(k) port-
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2006) (discussing disclosure assumptions); Richard L. Wiener et al., Unwrapping Assump-
tions: Applying Social Analytic Jurisprudence to Consumer Bankruptcy Education Re-
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ing consumers with needed information”); see also supra notes 233-37 and accompanying 
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 294. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Obser-
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collecting citations showing that many cognitive biases relevant to investing are not “easily 
remedied by information or education”); Wiener, supra note 293; see also infra notes 295-
324 and accompanying text.  
 295. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 349, 356-57 (1977). 
 296. Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 603.  For examples of difficulty with correcting the 
hindsight bias, see Lawrence J. Sanna & Norbert Schwarz, Debiasing the Hindsight Bias: 
The Role of Accessibility Experiences and (Mis)Attributions, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 287 (2003); Donald Sharpe & John G. Adair, Reversibility of the Hindsight Bias: 
Manipulation of Experimental Demands, 56 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 233 (1993) (Study 1). For some successful correction efforts, see id. (Study 2), 
using “never-knew-that” instructions, and Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Re-
ducing the Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
671 (1998), reducing hindsight bias for jurors. 
 297. Linda Babcock et al., Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 913, 916 (1997); see, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterex-
planation: Debiasing Techniques in the Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNITION 
126 (1982) (alternative explanations successful at debiasing); Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon 
B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals As Behavioral Primes: Priming the Simulation Heuristic 
and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384 (2000) (priming 
participants to think counterfactually decreased biases); Laura J. Kray & Adam D. Ga-
linsky, The Debiasing Effect of Counterfactual Mind-Sets: Increasing the Search for Discon-
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This is also an approach with using “deautomatization” to decrease 
the use of prejudicial stereotypes.298 Greg Mitchell recently summa-
rized some of the relevant literature demonstrating that although it 
is difficult, cognitive biases can sometimes be corrected through edu-
cation and instruction; his conclusion was that the potential for debi-
asing militates against Sunstein and Thaler’s claim that paternalism 
is inevitable.299 
 Another recommendation in the cognitive context has been for in-
dividuals simply to avoid the stimuli that might influence their deci-
sions and judgments.300 Similarly, in the emotion context, some re-
searchers have alluded to the possibility of educating decisionmakers 
about differences between calm- and emotion-state decisions, with 
the goal of helping them “avoid situations in which the dangerous 
temptation might occur.”301 Indeed, in his discussion of law and emo-
tions, Eric Posner has suggested that people do this naturally.302 
 There are difficulties with all of these approaches and inferences, 
however, that illustrate that they would likely be infeasible or unsuc-
cessful in the emotional bias context. First, we can hardly avoid all 
emotion-eliciting stimuli. Second, contrary to Professor Posner’s sug-
gestions, “we do not always know in advance whether information 
will bias our judgments; therefore, excessive exposure control will re-
sult in the failure to receive information that is diagnostic and use-
ful.”303 Third, directly relevant to the cost-benefit analysis, people will 
have to be “extremely vigilant, ready to shut their eyes and cover 
their ears whenever they suspected that potentially unwanted infor-
mation was in the vicinity: Is such vigilance worth the effort it en-
tails?”304 
 Fourth, in terms of counterarguments, it is hard to try to imagine 
identifying some “weakness” in emotion per se. And as seen in the 
hot-cold empathy gap section, it is also difficult to imagine oneself in 
                                                                                                                    
firmatory Information in Group Decisions, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 69 (2003) (showing that priming participants to think counterfactually de-
creased biases in subsequent tasks). But see Sanna & Schwarz, supra note 296 (thinking 
about alternative outcomes exacerbated hindsight bias). 
 298. See, e.g., Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes 
in Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142 (1996); Deana A. Pollard, 
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Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 953 (1999) (“[I]f a subject delib-
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 299. See Mitchell, supra note 9, at 1277 n.40 (collecting studies concerning debiasing of 
cognitive biases). 
 300. Wilson et al., supra note 276, at 195 (suggesting this “exposure control” strategy). 
 301. Loewenstein & Schkade, supra note 150, at 100. 
 302. See Posner, supra note 4. 
 303. Wilson et al., supra note 276, at 195. 
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another state. That is, if an individual is in a positive mood, it is hard 
to imagine decisionmaking in a negative mood (and may be even 
harder vice versa); if he is in a sexually aroused state, it would be dif-
ficult to imagine the alternative.305 It is equally difficult to apply an-
other means of reducing cognitive biases to the emotional context: 
one way of reducing the reliance on prejudicial stereotypes is self-
focus, sometimes as easy as placing a mirror in the room with some-
one making an evaluation. This apparently helps to heighten aware-
ness of discrepancy between consciously held beliefs, on the one 
hand, and unconscious stereotypes or negative responses, on the 
other.306 It is unclear, though, how this might be done with emotional 
biases, and emotion research does not suggest in detail how and why 
it might be successful. Thus, despite difficulties correcting cognitive 
biases through information and education, correcting emotional bi-
ases that way may be even harder. 
 Fifth, education as a debiasing mechanism is difficult and re-
source-intensive, especially in the emotional context. Moreover, it is 
often unsuccessful;307 for instance, efforts at paternalistic education 
regarding financial decisions is not especially effective.308 More 
                                                                                                                    
 305. Ariely and Loewenstein recently suggested that this may also raise concerns in 
the context of criminal law and punishment: 
[J]udges and jurors, who are generally unaroused when making decisions of 
guilt and punishment, may be excessively condemnatory and punitive toward 
sexual offenders because they make their decisions in a sexually unaroused 
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clear that such effects of arousal cannot justify any sexual exploitation, but 
they can make such behaviors somewhat more understandable. From the per-
spective of the legal system it is possible that sexual arousal should be given 
more credit as a partially mitigating factor than it would normally receive. 
Ariely & Loewenstein, supra note 220, at 96. 
 306. See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled 
Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 535-36 (1997); Ann C. McGinley, !Viva 
la Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
415, 425-32, 488 nn.376-82 (2000). 
 307. Hanson & Kysar report that: 
As Tversky and Kahneman have argued, “[e]ffective learning takes place only 
under certain conditions: [I]t requires accurate and immediate feedback about 
the relation between situational conditions and the appropriate response.” 
These requirements often are not met because: (i) outcomes are commonly de-
layed and not easily attributable to a particular action; (ii) variability in the 
environment degrades the reliability of the feedback . . .; (iii) there is often no 
information about what the outcome would have been if another decision had 
been taken; and (iv) most important decisions are unique and therefore provide 
little opportunity for learning. 
Hanson & Kysar, The Problem of Market Manipulation, supra note 252, at 691-92 (foot-
notes omitted) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Fram-
ing of Decisions, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND 
PSYCHOLOGY 67, 90-91 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987)). 
 308. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 121, at 73. 
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broadly, people view information and messages in biased fashion, 
and thus are unlikely to consider the possibility that their judgments 
are biased.309 Similarly, people may simply not believe the informa-
tional message to which they are exposed; and/or they may focus on 
factors not captured by the message.310 Professor Sunstein illustrates 
the difficulties of correcting perceptions biased by emotion in the con-
text of risk regulation and probability neglect:  
If government is attempting to decrease public concern with a risk 
that has a tiny probability of coming to fruition, it may be ineffec-
tive if it emphasizes the issue of probability; indeed, it may do bet-
ter if it changes the subject or stresses instead the affirmative so-
cial values associated with running the risk. On the other hand, 
public fear, however unwarranted, may be intractable, in the sense 
that it may be impervious to efforts at reassurance. And if public 
fear is intractable, it will cause serious problems, partly because 
fear is itself extremely unpleasant and partly because fear is likely 
to influence conduct, possibly producing wasteful and excessive 
private precautions. If so, a governmental response, via regulatory 
safeguards, would appear to be justified if the benefits, in terms of 
fear reduction, justify the costs.311 
 Sunstein’s point is: 
not simply that people may well misunderstand risk disclosures, 
perceiving the hazard as far greater than it is in fact. The problem 
is that the disclosure may alarm people, causing various kinds of 
harms, without giving them any useful information at all. If people 
neglect probability, they may fix, or fixate, on the bad outcome in a 
way that will cause anxiety and distress, but without altering be-
havior or even improving understanding.312 
 His concluding “lesson for policy: It might not be helpful to pre-
sent people with a wide range of information, containing both more 
assuring and less assuring accounts.”313 
 Another example of unsuccessful debiasing is in the context of the 
endowment effect. Some researchers have applied the lessons of cog-
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nitive debiasing, looking at whether the EE could be ameliorated by 
perspective-taking.314 Both cognitive and emotional biases prevent 
that, however. Cognitively, people overestimate the similarity be-
tween their own valuation of a good and the valuation by another.315 
Emotionally, this false prediction stems in part from people’s biased 
emotional predictions of how much they would value the good if they 
were in the shoes of the other party, whether that party is owner or 
buyer.316 That is, not only do people not predict that they will develop 
an increased liking from a commodity once it is owned, but people 
also take that increased valuation as an objective value and assume 
that a buyer would in fact value it approximately the same way (con-
versely, a potential buyer assumes that the seller values it approxi-
mately the same as she does). This leads to inefficiencies in the form 
of missed transactions. 
 Sixth, the awareness/motivation issues arise again. It is typically 
necessary that people be aware of their incidental or target-related 
mood in order to correct for it.317 As noted above, drawing attention to 
potential emotional bias can sometimes ameliorate the bias. How-
ever, this is clearly enormously difficult for a third party to monitor 
and continue to educate about—even with encouragement, people 
likely do not conduct their everyday activities monitoring their affec-
tive states. Even if that were feasible, it is simply unclear whether 
such attention works similarly for positive and negative moods,318 
and such awareness is not consistently effective for all people in all 
situations.319  
 Seventh, individuals tend to persevere with wrong thinking even 
when educated, and even recognizing that it is wrong. This is espe-
cially likely in the emotional bias context: again, recall Denes-Raj 
and Epstein’s jellybean experiment, where subjects’ emotional or ex-
periential reasoning overcame their rational reasoning, even when 
they were explicitly instructed about, and clearly understood, the 
relevant probabilities.320 The perseverance of emotionally-comforting 
superstitious activities or rituals, even though one “knows” rationally 
that they do not affect an outcome, illustrates this as well. 
 Finally, as mentioned above, even when biases are recognized, 
and people are motivated to correct them, individuals actually tend 
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to overcorrect for those biases.321 That is, when someone realizes that 
an incidental emotion might bias her decision, she may try to correct 
for it. However, because she may not always accurately assess the in-
tensity and duration of her emotions,322 and because she may not ac-
curately assess the degree of her emotional biases,323 she may over-
correct for the bias, leading to biased judgments in the opposite di-
rection.324 
3.   Debiasing Through Procedural Interventions 
 A number of procedural steps might be taken to improve indi-
viduals’ decisionmaking or to protect them from the consequences of 
their biased or faulty decisions. Sunstein and Thaler’s default rules 
are a good example; as are the “cooling-off periods” that are often 
suggested and occasionally implemented, with the goal of giving con-
sumers or others a chance to reconsider what might have been a 
hasty or emotionally-influenced decision. 
 The effect of choosing and changing default rules is thoroughly 
discussed in Sunstein and Thaler’s work.325 Their focus, however, was 
on such rules’ effects on cognitive biases; it is not yet clear whether 
the changes they proposed would be as effective for addressing the 
influence of emotion. Cooling-off periods, in contrast, are designed 
explicitly to counter the effect of emotional bias, by allowing the emo-
tional state to dissipate and the decisionmaker (individual or institu-
tional) to return to a cooler, calmer, more “rational” state. 
 As Camerer and others have noted, there are at least two different 
kinds of cooling-off periods.326 The first prevents a decisionmaker 
from making a decision or enacting a behavior until some amount of 
time has passed, presumably enough for the emotional state to dissi-
pate.327 The second allows the decision to be made or the behavior to 
be enacted during the “hot” emotional state, but permits the actor to 
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change her mind and revoke the decision, or possibly the conse-
quences of the behavior.328 
 Although both sorts are discussed as corrective paternalistic 
steps, and although both have in fact been applied in certain circum-
stances, both have flaws that suggest caution in their implementa-
tion, though not necessarily the caution that Camerer and colleagues 
have suggested. For instance, Camerer and colleagues suggest that 
cooling-off periods are somewhat “intrusive,” and as such should “be 
implemented with . . . reticence and only after careful analysis.”329 
They may be referring to the first sort of policy, involving mandatory 
waiting periods before a consumer may take possession of a pur-
chase. The latter sort, however, allowing a buyer to change his mind 
within a certain time frame, does not seem terribly intrusive, espe-
cially to the extent that it simply mandates inaction, providing an 
opportunity to sit back and allow an emotional influence to dissi-
pate.330 
 But difficulties exist nevertheless. The first type of cooling-off, 
simply waiting for an emotional state to die down, may not always be 
feasible. First, of course, either the actor or the intervenor must rec-
ognize the possibility of affective bias. As suggested above, actors are 
often simply unaware of the potential for such bias.331 It is also diffi-
cult for third parties to anticipate the influence of emotion unrelated 
to a judgment task and to prescribe a corrective.332 Second, relatedly, 
individuals must often make judgments or decisions about emotion-
ally-laden events or risks.333 It is unclear that the emotion associated 
with such decisions might dissipate; to some extent, considering the 
decision will continually evoke some strong, potentially biasing emo-
tion. The risk of terrorism, disease, or nuclear accidents are facile 
examples, but consider also the emotions the surrogate mother ex-
periences upon giving birth. Presumably, the emotions associated 
with raising the child continue—even after the emotions associated 
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with physically carrying the child end—and thus affect the decision 
to relinquish the child or not. Similarly, property owners subject to 
the endowment effect will likely not lose their glow of ownership; in-
deed, the effect demonstrates that that glow may only grow warmer.  
 As Camerer and colleagues recognize, the second type of cooling-
off period, allowing or encouraging the reversibility of decisions, can 
also be moot: “it is impossible, for example, to undo unsafe sex or sui-
cide.”334 But even where relevant, such cooling-off—like efforts to cor-
rect other biases—may simply be ineffective or even counterproduc-
tive. For instance, substantial research demonstrates that once a de-
cision is made, individuals tend to feel committed to it and seek to 
rationalize the decision by focusing on the benefits or positive aspects 
of the outcome of the decision or the product chosen.335 Individuals 
may thus tend not to change their mind even when they have the op-
tion to. 
 Such a tendency might in fact reinforce the perceived benefits of 
cooling-off periods and of the opportunity for reversible decisions. 
And, at least in the abstract, people think they prefer such change-
able outcomes. People behave as though reversible decisions are 
beneficial, and try to “pay premiums today for the opportunity to 
change their minds tomorrow.”336 However, cooling-off interventions 
that impose such opportunities may in fact be more problematic than 
assumed. As implied earlier in the discussion of “keeping doors 
open,”337 people are actually less satisfied with their choices when de-
cisions are reversible, deriving less utility from their choice or from 
the outcome than if the decision had been unchangeable. Accord-
ingly, if a cooling-off period is imposed paternalistically on consumers 
in order to allow an emotional state to disappear, but consumers 
know that the cooling-off period applies, then they may actually de-
rive less utility from the good than if it had been an irreversible sale: 
“buyers who pay to have escape clauses in their contracts may para-
doxically undermine, rather than advance, the cause of their own 
satisfaction.”338 
4.   Debiasing Through Substantive Interventions 
 The three relatively unintrusive mechanisms above might appeal 
to those who are concerned about nonoptimal decisionmaking, but 
who are nevertheless sensitive to autonomy or liberty concerns. 
Those less sensitive, or those persuaded by the empirical research 
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 336. Id. at 504. 
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reviewed earlier that such concerns must be held to a higher burden 
of persuasion, or those persuaded by the empirical research that such 
mechanisms are largely unsuccessful, might turn to more intrusive, 
substantive paternalistic intervention. From this perspective, at 
least two forms of governmental intervention might be appropriate: 
legislative (in which I include agency decisionmaking) and judicial. 
Both involve affirmatively substituting a third party’s decision or 
judgment for an individual’s, or involve constraining the individual’s 
decisionmaking options to eliminate the possibility of nonoptimal 
choices. 
 (a)   Legislative Substitution 
 The classic objection to such legislative (and even judicial) judg-
ment substitution appeared earlier: people know their tastes and 
preferences and act rationally to achieve them, better than any third 
party might know or do. As sketched above, though, people do make 
poor decisions.339 That observation, however—which drives much of 
this literature in the first place—does not necessarily demonstrate 
that a third party such as the government could do better. The essen-
tial question is whether a third party’s perception of “what is good for 
me” is sufficiently better than my perception (flawed as it may be) 
that it should act to replace or constrain my choices. The prevailing 
assumption, most famously expressed by John Stuart Mill, is that it 
is not: 
[W]ith respect to his own feelings and circumstances, the most or-
dinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably sur-
passing those that can be possessed by anyone else. The interfer-
ence of society to overrule his judgement and purposes in what 
only regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; 
which may be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as 
not to be misapplied to individual cases, by persons no better ac-
quainted with the circumstances of such cases than those are who 
look at them merely from without.340 
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 But in some instances, a third party may in fact make better 
choices and judgments regarding a particular individual’s prefer-
ences than that individual might himself. Importantly, at least three 
of these contexts are ones in which emotional biases are present. 
First, supporting the Millian perspective, it seems correct as an em-
pirical matter that third parties ordinarily overestimate the risk 
preferences of others.341 However, recall that in the context of nega-
tive events, overoptimism tends to reduce individuals’ perceptions of 
self-relevant risks;342 in one sense, overestimation might in fact bring 
the third party’s estimates closer to the truth. But recall that Hsee 
and Weber also showed that when the target of the prediction—that 
is, the person whose risk preferences are being estimated—is made 
salient, or “vivid,” the overestimation disappears.343 Personal interac-
tion or actual familiarity with the person is not necessary; in Hsee 
and Weber’s research, all that was necessary was visual observa-
tion.344 Thus, it may be that simply identifying the target individual 
to the third party may ameliorate overestimation by that third party, 
and may result in more accurate risk estimation than might simply 
leaving the decision to the potentially emotional individual. 
 Two clearer examples exist. Recall Professor Hsee’s other re-
search, demonstrating that when decisions are made about emotion-
ally-laden tasks, individuals tend to ignore probabilities except at ex-
tremes.345 Failure to attend to the probability of an event actually oc-
curring may easily lead to poor judgments on the individual’s part; 
when these individuals join together and express these inaccurate 
judgments, decisionmaking about such events can be biased. When 
decisionmakers attend more to “calculation,” however—to objective 
factors—and less to emotional aspects of an event, their judgments 
and decisions are far more sensitive to the accurately identified rela-
tive probabilities.346 Where lay perceptions of risk are biased due to 
emotional factors, more accurate third-party judgments of those risks 
                                                                                                                    
do a better job of choosing for B than B can do for himself . . . .”); O’Donoghue & Rabin, su-
pra note 225, at 186 (“Most adults in most situations make better choices for themselves 
than others would make for them. . . .”); Zamir, supra note 18, at 236 (noting that the fact 
that policymakers “lack intimate familiarity with the people to whom their rules apply . . . 
increases the probability that state paternalism will be ill-informed and counterproduc-
tive”). But see id. at 239 (suggesting, based on empirical observation of judgment and deci-
sion errors, that “Mill’s objection is unsound”). 
 341. Hsee & Weber, supra note 216, at 52. 
 342. See supra note 42. 
 343. Hsee & Weber, supra note 216, at 52. 
 344. Id. 
 345. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text. 
 346. Id.  
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should be substituted.347 Relevant contexts might be perceptions of 
nuclear accidents, terrorism,348 or self-relevant risks such as smoking 
or other addictive behavior. 
 What of the possibility that the very decisionmakers being substi-
tuted may also be subject to the impact of the emotionally-laden 
judgment?349 Again, being one step removed from the decision target 
may ameliorate that effect, as may the increased likelihood of focus-
ing on calculation. But some evidence also suggests that the act of 
group deliberation—though it does not necessarily ameliorate cogni-
tive biases, and is subject to other risks such as group polarization 
and groupthink350—may in fact alleviate some emotional biases on 
judgment.351 If so, then shifting decisions to deliberative groups, 
rather than to individuals and rather than to nondeliberative groups 
such as voters, might be useful in order to avoid emotional biases.352 
 Recall that many of the emotional biases reviewed above stemmed 
from the influence of concurrently experienced moods. A potential 
third-party intervenor, of course, is less likely to be under the influ-
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considered “paternalism”). 
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ence of the biasing mood in question. However, given that it is virtu-
ally impossible to predict what sort of incidental mood an individual 
might be subject to at the time of a particular decision task, substan-
tive legislative paternalism in this sense may be tantamount to re-
moving all decisions from individual decisionmakers; again, such a 
step seems disproportionate. Broadly speaking though, the justifica-
tion for this sort of substantive legislative paternalism may be not 
that such decisionmakers necessarily know individuals better than 
they do themselves, or necessarily make better decisions and judg-
ments.353 Rather, the justification may simply be that they are more 
likely to be free of particular emotional biases. Thus, one implication 
is to suggest cooling-off periods for judgments or decisions that are 
likely to be biased by immediate or incidental affect, and the use of 
experts or other substitute decisionmakers for judgments about or 
involving emotionally-laden events.354 
 (b)   Judicial Substitution 
 As Klick and Mitchell have suggested, it is useful to distinguish 
between ex ante paternalism, of the sort outlined in the sections 
above, and ex post paternalism, in which a third party, typically gov-
ernmental, acts retrospectively to “insulate the decision maker from 
the consequences of [a] thoughtless choice.”355 Here, again, we might 
think of a court stepping in to relieve an individual from the conse-
quences of an emotionally-biased decision as such ex post or judicial 
paternalism.356  
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 Such judicial paternalism might manifest in at least three ways, 
two retrospective in the sense just defined, and one—more narrow—
prospective. First, as outlined in some of the examples presented ear-
lier, a court might not choose to, or be able to, explicitly reverse a de-
cision that was made due to emotional bias. Instead, the court might 
impose liability on the party that prompted the affective influence on 
the decision. Traditional principles could be broadened in order to de-
termine such liability. In Professor Huang’s application, for instance, 
securities fraud doctrine would be expanded to include the influence 
of affective factors on investor decisionmaking. Professor Marrow ad-
vocates expanding unconscionability doctrine and developing a new 
unconscionability tort. Professors Hanson and Kysar provide new 
justification for applying enterprise liability in the context of deliber-
ate manipulation by industry and/or advertisers. And, though not 
advocating per se liability, I have suggested broadening the analysis 
under Casey of whether state-mandated “informed consent” informa-
tion might constitute an “undue burden” in a woman’s decisionmak-
ing about abortion by inappropriately creating an emotional state 
that increases her susceptibility to persuasion.357 
 Second, courts might void a contract because of emotional influ-
ence. This could, of course, take place under a showing of traditional 
emotional duress. But more broadly, it also might stem from a show-
ing that something induced a biasing emotional state, either conduct 
by one party (as in manipulation), or language in a contract (analo-
gous to the securities litigation example). It may also arise from a 
broader reading of traditional contract doctrine, in two possible ways 
(both developed in the surrogate mother context). On one account, 
recognizing that emotions might be mispredicted, and thus change, 
may justify such a change as the sort of “changed circumstances” 
that should void a contract. On another account, such failure to fully 
predict or understand one’s future emotions vitiates the fully in-
formed consent necessary to the formation of a valid contract.358 
 Third, more speculatively, a court might prospectively strike down 
conduct by a defendant that will probably lead to emotional manipu-
lation. This possibility may be most relevant in the abortion deci-
sionmaking context sketched above: if a state mandates particular 
information in an “informed consent” provision, and if it can be 
shown that such information is likely to influence a large proportion 
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see Shapiro, supra note 16, at 549 (noting suggestion that person at Time1 is sufficiently 
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 357. See Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion, supra note 22. 
 358. See Blumenthal, Affective Forecasting, supra note 4, at 210. 
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of the women in question, then there may be an argument under Ca-
sey for striking down the provision as unconstitutional.359 Again, I 
treat this discussion at more length elsewhere,360 but it is a useful in-
stance of a court intervening prospectively to protect an individual 
from emotionally-biased decisionmaking. 
 In many of these contexts, the biases result from another party’s 
manipulation. For all, however, the important judicial analysis will 
be ascertaining causality, both in the link between the defendant’s 
conduct and the experience of the particular biasing emotion or 
mood, and between the emotion or mood and the decision—for the 
latter, perhaps some sort of “but for” causation. 
 At least two objections to judicial paternalism arise: institutional 
objections and a “slippery slope” argument. Professor Shapiro has 
suggested that legislatures are in a better institutional position than 
courts to act paternalistically.361 Professors Kaplow and Shavell 
make a similar suggestion, based on their skepticism that courts can 
know litigants sufficiently well to ascertain their true preferences 
correctly.362 I am not wholly persuaded by either point. First, Profes-
sor Shapiro in part suggests that courts should be restrained given 
our society’s commitment “to the value of self-determination.”363 Of 
course, this objection—addressed in the section above discussing jus-
tifications for paternalism—might apply equally well, or equally 
poorly, to legislative paternalistic action. Shapiro also points to insti-
tutional constraints on courts, such as their reactive rather than 
proactive nature, the binding nature of precedent, and courts’ inabil-
ity relative to legislatures to undertake information gathering, inves-
tigation, and experimentation and monitoring of experiment out-
comes.364 Accurate as these comments might be as descriptions of the 
courts’ role, none shows dispositively that a court is an inappropriate 
vehicle for administering relief to an individual whose decision, by 
hypothesis, does not reflect his true preferences. Indeed, courts are 
routinely faced with individual litigants, a need to gather informa-
tion concerning those litigants, and decisionmaking based heavily on 
those facts and information. This fact also goes to the second part of 
the institutional objection—that courts are insufficiently familiar 
with the subjects of the paternalistic action, and therefore are less 
able than the party or a legislature to ascertain that party’s true 
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preferences. Robin West has suggested that judges faced with such 
individual litigants are in fact in a better position than legislators to 
make such determinations;365 Kaplow and Shavell are “skeptical,” 
particularly for appellate courts that “may never even meet the par-
ties.”366 But the point here is that the plaintiff has asked the court to 
overturn an earlier decision as inconsistent with her true prefer-
ences. Accordingly, the judicial analysis, again, is focused less on as-
certaining those preferences—though proving them may still be a 
hurdle—and more on traditional questions such as causation. The in-
stitutional objection, therefore, is not fatal to this approach. 
 Second, the slippery slope objection might argue that simply as a 
quantitative matter, litigation designed to rescind contracts or ex-
cuse a party from a decision or from obligations will increase. A facile 
response is that that possibility is an empirical matter: we will have 
to simply wait and see. Another response, however, is that by hy-
pothesis, we do have a plaintiff experiencing an injury—in the form 
of nonoptimal consequences that the individual erroneously chose—
from which he should be protected. And “[i]t is the business of the 
law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the expense of a ‘flood 
of litigation.’ ”367 Finally, and perhaps ironically, it might be that 
drawing attention to the possibility of emotional bias by establishing 
a judicial remedy might alleviate the mistakes in the first place. That 
is, awareness of the remedy might heighten focus on emotional influ-
ences when an individual engages in decisionmaking, thereby reduc-
ing the likelihood that that emotion will influence that decisionmak-
ing and avoiding the possibilities of moral hazard. If so, establishing 
such a regime might in fact decrease the likelihood of such mistakes 
and of the litigation that might ensue. 
 One might also object as a qualitative matter: because the plain-
tiff enters the litigation with the bare assertion that her preferences 
have changed, such litigation could have an inappropriately in-
creased chance of success. Again, however, the plaintiff has the bur-
den of proof: not only for causation—showing that defendant’s con-
duct induced a particular emotional state—but also for what her true 
preferences might have been. Concomitantly, she must demonstrate 
that absent the emotional manipulation she would more likely have 
made the alternative decision.368 Professor Marrow’s requirement 
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that plaintiff show “damages directly and exclusively attributable to 
[defendant’s] act or actions” in part illustrates this burden.369 Of 
course, plaintiff would also have to show some injury that resulted 
from the biased decision.  
V.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 There is little question that individuals do not conform well to the 
rational decisionmaker model posited by traditional law and econom-
ics. Our reasoning and decisionmaking about what is good for us is 
often flawed, our ability and motivation to seek full and unbiased in-
formation is often low, our susceptibility to manipulation by others is 
often high. These cognitive failings often serve us poorly, and legal 
and policy commentary has begun to turn toward consideration of 
what such failings imply about the propriety of third-party interven-
tion to protect us from ourselves. 
 Less consideration has been given, however, to the implications of 
judgmental errors stemming from emotional factors. In this Article I 
highlighted differences between cognitive and emotional sources of 
such errors, reviewing a number of affective biases that had not been 
raised previously in the legal literature, and discussed “emotional 
paternalism”—that is, what implications such affective biases might 
have for paternalistic policy. More important, I discussed in more de-
tail than previous work has the effectiveness with which some of 
these affective errors might be corrected. Commentators have re-
cently decided that “paternalism is here to stay,”370 and that as a re-
sult, we must balance the costs and benefits of developing such in-
tervention in determining whether it is appropriate. The discussion 
in Part IV of broad paternalistic interventions to debias individuals 
in their decisionmaking contributes to the discussion of such balanc-
ing. I showed that many such interventions are less likely to succeed 
than may have been assumed, especially in the context of emotional 
biases. I suggested that because of such difficulties, substituting the 
judgment of experts from the legislative or judicial context may in 
certain circumstances be appropriate. 
 In particular, legislatures might develop cooling-off periods for 
judgments or decisions that are likely to be biased by immediate or 
incidental emotions, especially ones involving self-relevant health 
and welfare risks.371 Expert judgment in place of individuals’ might 
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be appropriate for judgments about or involving emotionally-laden 
events, such as disease, terrorism, and other high-risk but low-
probability events. Judicial intervention may be appropriate when an 
individual should be relieved of the burdens of having made an emo-
tionally-biased, harmful decision, especially one that can be shown to 
have been manipulated by another. Examples were fear- or anxiety-
influenced abortion decisions, deliberate manipulation by advertisers 
or contractual parties, or certain investment decisions. Thus, proce-
dural and even substantive paternalism is likely appropriate in 
many cases involving emotional biases, because the potential welfare 
benefits are high and the implementation costs, at least in terms of 
likelihood of success, are relatively low. 
 But as my debiasing review suggests, there are a number of in-
stances in which implementation costs are high, because the effec-
tiveness of debiasing or corrective measures is relatively low. In emo-
tional paternalism instances in which implementation costs are ele-
vated because intervention is not especially likely to succeed—my 
examples were various sorts of informational and educational inter-
vention—interference in decisionmaking may be unwarranted, not 
because the decisions or consequences are unimportant and the bene-
fits not high, but because the costs are, at least apparently, equally 
high. If intervention is likely to be unsuccessful, perhaps the “plausi-
ble prima facie reason to be cautious about paternalism”—the auton-
omy argument—can shoulder its persuasive burden.372 
 Moreover, there are many instances in which affective biases im-
pinge on judgment and decisionmaking, but the implications of the 
individual judgment may not rise to the level of, say, judgments 
about terrorist attack, nuclear meltdown, disposition of frozen em-
bryos, or surrogate motherhood. Here, there are costs other than im-
plementation costs to consider: various derivative costs of paternalis-
tic activity. Professor Glaeser has suggested some such costs, such as 
stigmatization of those who engage in particular conduct.373 But it is 
also the case that “social forces strongly influence the personal 
choices that affect . . . the beliefs, values and preferences—of indi-
viduals, care providers and policy makers—that determine when, 
and what kinds of, public interventions will be successful, or even ac-
ceptable.”374 One such social force is the passionate adherence to the 
importance of autonomy, especially in domains most likely to be in-
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volved in emotional paternalism.375 Simply referring to “paternalism” 
can itself generate negative emotional responses, leading, as noted 
above, to a visceral unwillingness to accept the proposed intervention 
“as a matter of principle.”376 Certainly, the psychic cost of public re-
luctance to comply with a policy perceived as imposing on autonomy 
is one to be carefully incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis.377 
That is, one factor in that analysis is the public’s potentially different 
perceptions of interventions dealing with emotion and ones dealing 
with thoughts or cognitions; the public may be even more unwilling 
to accept intervention dealing with emotional issues. Such psychic 
costs are clearly relevant in developing policy for protecting indi-
viduals in their decisions in relatively less important domains. The 
calculus should be considered too, though, even in more important 
domains.378 
 As such, paternalism is often appropriate and sometimes war-
ranted, but should be applied only after careful cost-benefit analysis, 
including the costs of implementing the particular policy in question. 
In this I agree with recent commentators.379 Absent from their dis-
cussion, however, has been consideration of emotional biases in 
judgment, of what empirical research suggests about remedying such 
biases, and of the implications of such research for assessing such 
“implementation costs.” By highlighting “emotional paternalism,” my 
goal has been to help fill these gaps and further extend this impor-
tant discussion. 
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